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Abstract 
As individuals or families hold a substantial share of a firm at the cost of less diversified 
portfolio, they specialize their portfolio and have better inside information. Does the market 
marker react to this fact and maintain higher level of asymmetric information cost for such 
family-controlled firms? We analyze the bid-ask spread and the probability of informed trading 
(PIN) of Canadian-based publicly traded firms cross-listed with NYSE/AMEX to test this notion. 
We find that although the market maker maintains higher average spread, he does not form 
higher PIN for family-controlled firms when the entire day is considered as an event period.  
The assumption of constant arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders during the 
day in Easley et al (1996b) is rejected in the two periods per day analysis. In addition, the notion 
of information event occurrence prior to the day in Easley et al (1996b) is consistently rejected as 
higher (non-statistically) probability of information events is found in the afternoon (second 
session) in the two (three) periods per day analyses, respectively. Based on these findings, we 
have serious doubts about any existing findings (including ours) of PIN based on one period per 
day. As such, we consider the possibility of several periods per day.  
Though it remains an empirical question to choose how many periods should be 
considered, we find our results using two and three periods per day to be very interesting. We 
consistently reject the hypothesis that the PIN is higher for family-controlled firms. Since the 
market maker does not need to maintain high spread for firms with very high number of 
uninformed traders and very low number of informed traders, we do not perceive our findings to 
be either surprising or contradictory to the present literature. By developing a different 
formulation of PIN, we also show that this is empirically less than that developed by Easley et al 
(1996b). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the level of asymmetric information and its impact on the 
probability of informed trading (PIN) of Canadian-based, publicly traded family-
controlled firms cross-listed with the U.S. exchanges and we compare this with a sample 
of widely-held cross-listed firms. More specifically, we estimate different parameters of 
the likelihood function of Easley et al (1996b) to calculate PINs for both of our samples 
and analyze whether the PIN of family-controlled firms is higher than that of widely-held 
firms. We define family-controlled firms to be firms in which individuals, families, or 
any non-financial groups (excluding pension funds, mutual funds, investment funds, etc.) 
have more than a 10% voting right.1
Several existing studies in market microstructure, e.g. Copeland and Galai (1983), 
Golsten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Easley et al (1996a, 1996b and 
1997), have examined the impact of information asymmetry on stock prices. Informed 
traders have special information about the stock value and therefore, always expect to 
gain by trading with the market maker. A market maker presumably cannot detect 
informed traders, and therefore maintains a spread to recoup losses from uninformed 
traders. Easley et al (1996b) present a mechanism (called PIN) to estimate the probability 
of informed trading. They document a higher PIN for less actively traded stocks and 
argue that the value of these face more asymmetric information. Chiang and Venkatesh 
(1988) note a greater level of information asymmetry for smaller firms. Easley et al 
(2002) reach a similar conclusion by using the PIN variable. If PIN is a good statistic to 
                                                 
1 This criterion follows La Porta et al (1999). They define control at 10% because it is a significant 
threshold of votes to influence decision making. 
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estimate the probability of informed trading, it should provide different values for 
samples containing significantly different levels of information asymmetry. 
Several studies in corporate finance (e.g. Seyhun (1986), Howe and Lin (1990), 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988), and Fidrmuc et al (2006)) suggest that abnormal profits 
are made by insiders. Since insiders profit at the cost of the market maker, studies like 
Seyhun (1986) and Howe and Lin (1990) also report a positive relationship between the 
bid-ask spread and the market maker’s expected losses to insiders. Furthermore, Fidrmuc 
et al (2006) recommend considering a narrower definition of insiders to get more 
pronounced abnormal returns in the U.S. context. This implies that some insiders possess 
more inside information than others.  
Individuals, families, or a group of people may act as insiders by controlling 
significant shareholdings. In a model presented by Burkart et al (2002), a founder of a 
firm is willing to hold a substantial shareholding if he expects the potential amenities 
(non-pecuniary benefits) to be very large. This may apply to a large proportion of 
Canadian firms. Morck et al (1998), La Porta et al (1999), and our sample of cross-listed 
public companies over 2004-05 report a large number of family-controlled firms. Morck 
et al (1998) also elaborately document the intensity of influence that several controlling 
individuals or families have on firms’ management in Canada. Since controlling groups 
related to the management have access to inside information, market markers may face 
substantial losses when trading with them. In this study, we hypothesize that market 
makers quote higher bid-ask spread for family-controlled firms to recoup such losses. As 
a higher level of information asymmetry is suspected in family-controlled firms, we also 
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suspect a higher probability of informed trading for these firms, which should lead to a 
higher PIN estimate. 
This study is important and innovative for several reasons. First, although several 
studies have documented abnormal profits by insiders, further research is definitely 
warranted with a narrower definition of insiders. We consider family-controlled versus 
widely-held firms to serve this purpose. We test whether the bid-ask spread and PIN are 
higher for family-controlled firms. Second, we attempt to answer a corporate finance 
problem from a market microstructure point of view. To the best of our knowledge, no 
existing study has tested the probability of informed trading in this context. Third, in 
addition to the conventional approach of taking a trading day as an event period, we 
segregate each trading day into multiple periods. Easley et al (1997) note “the assumption 
that information event occurs only prior to the start of a trading day is clearly an 
abstraction”.2 On the other hand, it is an empirical fact that trading volume is higher 
during the first and last couple of hours of the day (e.g., Lee and Ready (1991) observe 
higher trading volume before 11:00 am and after 2:30 pm of a day). Do different trading 
frequencies (and trader arrival rates) within a day imply different event periods? Do the 
assumptions of constant arrival rates of both informed and uninformed traders throughout 
the day in Easley et al (1996a, 1996b, 1997) hold? We try to address these questions 
empirically in this study. Fourth, we derive a different formulation to calculate the 
probability of informed trading, which we dub modified PIN. In this paper, we also 
attempt to empirically investigate whether the PIN calculation of Easley et al (1996b) is 
significantly different from our modified PIN. 
                                                 
2 See page 810 of Easley et al (1997). 
 3
Our most important empirical result, which may be the most interesting one, is 
that the market maker does not form significantly different PINs for family-controlled 
(PINFC) and widely-held firms (PINWH) considering a whole trading day as an event 
period. However, he does so for the morning session (before 1:00 pm) in the two-period 
analysis. Though the average PINFC is found to be higher than the average PINWH in the 
one-period and three-periods -per-day analysis, we find an opposite scenario in the two-
periods-per-day analysis. Based on the evidence, we conclusively report that the market 
maker does not form significantly higher PIN for family-controlled firms. We also find 
that PIN for family-controlled firms for the morning session differs from that of the 
afternoon session (after 1:00 pm). We perceive our findings consistent with existing 
literature as the market maker does not need to maintain a high spread for firms with a 
high number of uninformed traders and a low number of informed traders. In addition, 
informed traders may not trade on their information (e.g. due to strict state regulation). 
Although various studies in corporate finance report abnormal returns by insiders, we do 
not know what proportion of such insiders actually trade. Furthermore, we do not 
investigate in this study whether controlling individuals/families are related to the 
management. The level of information asymmetry of a firm is expected to be low if the 
controlling individuals/families are found to be unrelated to the management [see 
Fidrmuc et al (2006)]. This fact should result in lower PIN. 
Our findings provide evidence in favour of different arrival rates of informed and 
uninformed traders within the trading day. Therefore, we reject the assumption of 
constant arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders in the Poisson processes of the 
likelihood function developed by Easley et al (1996b). Furthermore, the assumption that 
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information events occur only at the beginning of the day is consistently rejected for our 
sample firms by finding a higher probability of information events for multiple event 
periods per day. 
These results cast serious doubts on the existing findings that involve PIN being 
estimated using a full trading day as an event period. Since we reach different 
conclusions by considering different periods per trading day, i.e. statistically similar PINs 
for family-controlled and widely-held firms in the three-periods-per-day analysis and 
significantly lower PIN for family-controlled firms in the two-periods-per-day analysis, 
we recommend further research to reconcile this issue, as it is critical to estimate PIN. 
Finally, we find that the probability of information events is significantly greater than 
zero and less than 1, which causes the PIN of Easley et al (1996b) to be significantly 
different from the modified one, as we will show in Section 4.3. 
This study is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we set up a foundation to 
justify the current study. After considerable discussion of related papers, we develop 
several hypotheses. Chapter 3 deals with sample construction and methodology. Besides 
explaining the PIN of Easley et al (1996b), we also develop our modified PIN. In Chapter 
4, we present our findings on firms cross-listed with NYSE and AMEX. We use several 
parametric and non-parametric test statistics to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
2. It should be noted that we perform our analysis of family-controlled and widely-held 
firms by considering unconstrained likelihood estimation function. However, we perform 
a robustness check using constrained likelihood estimation in Chapter 4 to further 
strengthen our findings. In addition, we present findings on NASDAQ listed firms. In 
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Chapter 5, we summarize our findings and outline some potential research topics related 
to this study. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
We discuss several papers related to this study in the first section of this chapter. To 
ensure a clear understanding of the existing literature and its relation to the current study, 
we begin by relating information asymmetry to spread. Next, we present existing findings 
on the relationship between insider trading and spread. Then we justify using family-
controlled firms as those with greater information asymmetry. Since we analyze 
information asymmetric cost through the probability of informed trading in the current 
study, we provide a detail explanation of relevant information-based trading models and 
the PIN. 
 Based on the literature review, we develop several hypotheses in Section 2 of this 
chapter. We also outline our expectations on those hypotheses. 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Information Asymmetry and Spread 
In economic theory, market participants are assumed to submit their demand and supply 
schedules to set up the equilibrium price in a Walrasian auction where the auctioneer 
ensures perfect competition. Perfect competition refers to the presence of perfect 
information and no transaction costs. This concept of equilibrium price in a Walrasian 
auction setup does not reflect the reality of stock markets around the world. In addition to 
imperfect information and transaction costs, there is also the cost of immediacy. A 
market maker is significantly different from a Walrasian auctioneer and therefore, faces a 
different problem. 
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In a world with asymmetric information, the decision making processes of market 
participants become more complicated. Studies of the 2001 Nobel Laureates Akerlof 
(1970), Spence (1973), and Stiglitz (1980, with Grossman) provide a basis for research 
on information asymmetry. Akerlof (1970) demonstrates the impact of information 
asymmetry in a market where bad quality products drive out good quality products. 
Spence (1973) shows how potential employees signal employers about their quality in a 
market with asymmetric information. He illustrates that both high and low quality 
employees are better off in a market where signalling is possible. Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) directly question the efficient market hypothesis in the presence of asymmetric 
information. They argue that price cannot reflect all available information, since if it 
could, there would be no incentive for informed traders to acquire costly information. 
Market microstructure is the field that analyzes the market maker’s decision 
problem in the presence of asymmetric information costs (adverse selection cost), and 
cost of immediacy and trading. In particular, it attempts to investigate how the market 
maker incorporates some of these costs into stock prices. Considering different types of 
costs, researchers in this area have introduced two distinct models: inventory-based 
models and information-based models. Both models obtain a positive bid-ask spread after 
considering relevant factors. However, the analysis of one model requires enough 
assumptions to limit the influence of another. Despite this apparent limitation, the 
information-based model is widely accepted for its appealing theoretical robustness and 
empirical findings. 
In inventory-based models [see, for example, Garman (1976)], the market maker 
acts as a dealer and wants to hold an optimal level of inventory of stock and cash. Buy 
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and sell orders arrive to the market, and since these orders do not synchronize, the dealer 
has to shift from his preferred level of holdings. If the market maker runs out of either 
stock or cash, he fails. To avoid this failure problem, he maintains a spread by buying at a 
lower bid price and selling at a higher ask price. However if the dealer has a preferred 
level of holding, then inventory will be mean-reverting and this may induce serial 
dependence in prices, a phenomenon that complicates the inventory effects.3
The information-based trading models take both the cost of immediacy and 
asymmetric information into account. Bagehot (1971) is mainly credited for instigating 
research in asymmetric information. He notes that market gains and trading gains carry 
different meanings. Uninformed traders may lose even when the market gains; informed 
traders may establish specific trading mechanisms to gain at the expense of uninformed 
traders. Based on this idea, Copeland and Galai (1983) consider a market with informed 
traders in a two-period framework. In this framework, uninformed traders transact for 
exogenous reasons4 while informed traders’ trading interest is obvious. Since the dealer 
always loses to informed traders, he maintains a spread between bid and ask prices to 
recoup losses from uninformed traders. In their two-period model, one round of trading 
discloses all the underlying asymmetric information and there is no need for the market 
maker to learn from the previous trades. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) consider a sequential trading model, which allows 
the market maker to learn from previous trades. In their market setup, the specialist 
quotes bid and ask prices, traders arrive to the specialist’s post one by one (each having 
                                                 
3 See O’Hara (1995). 
4 Milgrom and Stockey (1982) note that since uninformed traders always loss to informed traders, it is 
optimal for them not to be involved in speculation-based trading. Therefore, uninformed traders only trade 
for non-speculation reasons, e.g. liquidity reasons. 
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the option to trade one unit of stock or leave) and the specialist is free to update his bid 
and ask prices after each round of trading. An important assumption is that the specialist 
knows the probabilistic structure of the arrival process and therefore, knows the 
probability of trading with an informed trader. Like uninformed traders, informed traders 
have access to past transaction prices (Ht) and the bid (BBt) and ask (At) prices at time t. In 
addition, informed traders have special information (Jt) about the stock price. Stock price 
has an eventual end-of-day (or end-of-period) price, which is denoted as a random 
variable V. In this scenario, the trader will trade if any of the following conditions are 
satisfied. 
Buy if Z A
Sell if Z B
t t
t t
>
< , 
where Z I E V H A B I E V H J A Bt t t t t t t tt = + t−[ , , ] ( ) [ , , ,1 ] . It = 1 if trader is uninformed 
and 0 otherwise. In other word, Zt is the investor’s perception of the assets fair value. 
Given this behaviour of the traders, a competitive market maker with St 
information sets his bid and ask prices in the following fashion: 
A E V S Z A E V S Buy
B E V S Z B E V S Sell
t t t t t
t t t t t
= > =
= < =
[ , ] [ ,
[ , ] [ ,
]
]
. 
 
The main contribution of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is clear from these prices: 
the specialist forms his bid (ask) price by conditioning on the next trade being seller 
(buyer) initiated. The market maker essentially learns through a Bayesian process. He 
believes that the trade sequences can reveal underlying information and therefore, adjusts 
prices accordingly. The authors show that the specialist’s expected value and informed 
traders’ perceived value of the stock eventually converge. Another important finding of 
this study is that the market collapses if the insiders are too numerous – a situation very 
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similar to that in Akerloff (1970). The market maker will set so high an ask price and so 
low a bid price that even the informed traders would incur a loss if they traded. 
Both Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) consider 
competitive informed traders who do not trade strategically. Kyle (1985) weakens this by 
assuming that the informed traders know the exact distribution of the uninformed traders’ 
order flow and may use this information to camouflage their trades. In Kyle’s (1985) 
model, the market marker sets the price by observing aggregate order flow of informed 
and uninformed traders. In doing so, he takes the market depth (1/λ) into consideration. 
He aggregates all the order flow and clears all trades at a single price in a batch-trading 
setup. Since our objective is to empirically test whether information asymmetry induces a 
spread, we do not consider Kyle’s (1985) model in detail. 
2.1.2 Insider Trading and Spread 
We begin by relating information asymmetry to spread. As discussed, one of the most 
important findings of Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is that 
information asymmetry alone is sufficient to induce a spread. Since the market maker 
widens the bid-ask spread in anticipation of informed trading, it is expected in these 
studies that the informed traders’ (or insiders’) profits will be abnormally large (with 
these profits arising indirectly through losses to uninformed traders). 
Seyhun (1986) is the first to empirically analyze and support the hypothesis of 
Copeland and Galai (1983), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that a positive relationship 
exists between the insiders’ abnormal profits and the bid-ask spreads. Seyhun (1986) 
examines approximately 60,000 insider transactions of NYSE and AMEX, and finds that 
insiders can predict the future movements of stock prices and make abnormal profits. In 
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particular, insiders purchase stocks before making public any favourable information and 
sell after the release of such information. Seyhun (1986) is also the first to analyze the 
sources of insiders’ superior predictive ability. It appears from his analysis that insiders 
more-closely associated with the everyday decision-making process, e.g. officer-directors 
and chairmen of the board of directors,5 trade on more valuable information than the 
other insiders. Howe and Lin (1990) conduct an analogous research on the 
OTC/NASDAQ market and find very similar results to those of Seyhun (1986). They find 
all insiders except large unaffiliated shareholders to be successful predictors of future 
stock price movements. 
Why is the large shareholders’ predictive ability not in line with other insiders? 
Demsetz (1986) reports that families and individuals, as corporate insiders, own a 
significant proportion of a firm at the expense of having a less diversified portfolio. In 
doing so, they specialize their portfolio. On the other hand, institutional investors like 
pension funds may also hold a substantial portion of a firm’s stock. These institutions 
also have an incentive to acquire information due to the economy of scale effect. 
However, Demsetz (1986) states that for “legal and fiduciary constraints”, institutional 
investors do not specialize their portfolios. Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) analyze this 
question empirically from the viewpoint of dealers/specialists. They find that 
dealers/specialists perceive corporate insiders as a major factor in determining the 
information trading cost (or adverse selection cost). However, institutional holdings are 
not found to influence the dealer’s/specialist’s information trading cost in the presence of 
holding cost variables. We should note that the large shareholders in Seyhun (1986) and 
                                                 
5 Directors, officers, chairmen of the board, officer-directors and large shareholders are five different types 
of insiders in Seyhun (1986) 
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Howe and Lin (1990) are not related to the management of the firms. In addition, large 
shareholders, such as investment advisors and other financial institutions, cannot be 
insiders [see footnote 33 of Fidrmuc et al (2006)]. Therefore, large shareholders of those 
studies may be best termed as institutional investors. 
Admati et al (1994) theoretically prove that monitoring activism by large 
shareholders is consistent with equilibrium even with the “free-rider” problem. A “free-
rider” problem occurs as small shareholders benefit from the monitoring activities of 
large shareholders without directly paying for the service. Many empirical studies 
analyze the effect of monitoring activities on information asymmetry and thereby, spread. 
For example, Jiang and Kim (2005) report significant negative relationship among 
institutional ownership, analyst following, and spread. They analyze U.S. and non-U.S. 
stocks (ADRs), and document that higher spreads on non-U.S. stocks are due to less 
institutional ownership and a lower number of analysts following those stocks. Our 
explanation to this is that institutional investors, as non-insiders, may analyze public 
information only and thus make the market more efficient in a semi-strong sense. 
A recent study by Fidrmuc et al (2006) analyzes the trading of a specific type of 
insiders within the context of the U.K. market. Their results not only confirm the existing 
findings that insiders are better informed and make abnormal profits but also explain why 
insiders are better informed. They analyze the trading of the U.K. directors, and find that 
the U.K. directors’ abnormal returns are much higher than those of the U.S. insiders. 
Besides accounting for the more stringent and faster reporting regulation of the U.K., 
they claim that the difference in the definition of insiders in these two countries may 
induce different abnormal returns. Since the U.S. has a broader definition of insiders and 
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since most of the U.S. papers investigate the effects of aggregate insider trading, the 
lower abnormal returns found in the U.S. studies are not surprising. Another interesting 
aspect of this study is that it takes into account the firm’s ownership structure when 
considering directors’ transactions in the presence of outside blockholders, i.e. 
institutional investors, corporations and families/individuals. By regressing directors’ 
abnormal returns on different dummy variables of blockholders, they find corporations 
and families/individuals have a negative and institutional investors have a positive 
relationship with the directors’ abnormal profits. However, only the coefficient of 
corporation is found to be significant at 1% level. They conclude that corporations better 
serve to monitor the management to ensure value maximization and mitigate problems of 
information asymmetry than institutional investors. This finding confirms the idea of 
Demsetz (1986) that concentrated ownership with less diversified portfolio encourages 
monitoring activities. 
Monitoring activities, and therefore information asymmetry, may also be a 
function of the perceived company performance. Bradley and Seyhun (1997) analyze 
insider trading of firms filing bankruptcy petitions. They find significant sales by insiders 
before filing dates. Although insiders may minimize their losses by selling before the 
public announcement of such news, such actions essentially increase the risk to outside 
atomistic shareholders. 
Bid-ask spread may also be influenced by the firm size effect of Banz (1981). 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) note that a smaller firm usually has a smaller number of 
insiders who are able to pose a greater threat to and induce a greater adverse selection 
problem for the dealer/specialist. Several studies like Seyhun (1986), Howe and Lin 
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(1990), and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) find abnormal profits of insider trading even after 
considering for firm size effect and trading costs. By considering the transaction costs 
effectively, these studies also put an end to the long-standing controversy that outsiders 
can make abnormal profits by mimicking insiders’ trading. 
In a nutshell, the existing literature documents abnormal profits by insiders and 
reports a positive relationship between insiders’ abnormal returns and spreads. This 
makes it evident that the market maker observes or infers such trading and adjusts his 
prices accordingly. 
2.1.3 Family-Controlled Firms and Insider Trading 
The existing literature inarguably reports that insider trading introduces bid-ask spreads. 
Different studies have considered different types of insiders. Seyhun (1986) and Howe 
and Lin (1990) consider officers, directors, officer-directors, chairmen of the board and 
large shareholders as insiders. Though any types of informed traders will induce a spread 
in their model, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) refer to the “informed traders as insiders”. 
Whatever may be their intention, this definition of insiders obviously excludes large 
shareholders or institutional investors who are especially skilled in processing public 
information. In addition, Fidrmuc et al (2006) document that large shareholders cannot be 
insiders due to some regularity conditions. As discussed earlier, their finding suggests the 
need for further research by considering stringent criteria for defining insiders. 
Burkart et al (2002) develop a theoretical model where the founder of a firm has 
to hire a professional or to leave the management to his heir. In this situation, the founder 
faces three options: selling his entire shareholding, retaining a large portion of holding 
and floating the rest, and retaining the firm within the family by passing the charge to his 
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heir. The authors show that when the founder’s potential “amenity” (non-pecuniary 
private benefits) is very large, the founder keeps a large stake in the firm. This indeed 
explains why so many public companies in Canada are family-controlled. Morck et al 
(1998) report only 67 firms as widely-held out of 246 largest public companies at the 
20% control level.6 La Porta et al (1999) document that 30% of the largest 20 Canadian 
firms are family-controlled at the 10% control level. They also find 50% of medium-
sized7 publicly traded firms to be family-controlled at the same control level. The 
findings of these studies suggest that amenities received by the Canadian controlling 
families are substantial to maintain such ownership in the long run. If this is truly the 
case, we suspect trading by controlling families, as insiders, discloses asymmetric 
information. Realizing this, the market maker must establish a sufficiently wide spread. 
In contrast, studies like Doidge et al (2004) report that controlling shareholders of 
firms that cross-list with the U.S. exchanges find it more profitable to limit their non-
pecuniary private benefits when growth opportunities that cannot be attained without 
external funds are large. The underlying idea is that firms in countries with less stringent 
regulations positively signal the market by listing with the U.S. exchanges. However, the 
regulations of the organized exchanges in Canada and the U.S. are similar. In addition, it 
is less stringent for Canadian companies to cross list with the U.S. exchanges, e.g. 
Canadian firms are not required to comply with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principals (GAAP). 
2.1.4 Information-based Trading Models and the Probability of Informed Trading 
                                                 
6 Their result is based on 1988 Financial Post 500. They exclude 254 firms from their sample since those 
are privately held. They also report 44, 27 and 29 firms as controlled by heirs, business entrepreneurs, and 
other individuals or families (type unclear) respectively. Control level is determined by the voting power. 
7 Medium-size firms are defined as firms having at least $500 million or more. It should be noted that the 
authors considered only 10 firms in their sample. 
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Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985) form the main 
basis for modern market microstructure study. However, Kyle’s (1985) model considers 
the strategic behaviour of an informed trader in an auction setting environment. 
Easley et al (1996a, 1996b) calculate the probability of informed trading, which is 
the crux of our interest, in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara 
(1987), and Easley et al (1997). These studies consider sequential trading models where 
the market participants are risk neutral and competitive. This assumption of risk 
neutrality and competitiveness compels the market maker quote continuously8 to yield 
zero expected profit conditional on the trade type and the informed trader trade the 
maximum quantity in the next available opportunity.  
Easley and O’Hara (1987) weaken the assumption of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
that traders are allowed to choose one unit of stock each time. They also consider 
information uncertainty by assuming that an information event may occur at the 
beginning of each trading day. In this framework, a separating equilibrium arises if the 
informed traders’ expected profit is maximized by choosing to trade large quantity only. 
If this condition of profit-maximizing large quantity trading is violated, the separating 
equilibrium is replaced by a pooling one. Since the market maker expects only the 
informed traders to trade large quantity in the separating equilibrium, his Bayesian 
learning process now considers both trade type and trade size.9 This price formation 
allows even a zero spread in the case of no information uncertainty and no informed 
                                                 
8 Lee and Ready (1991) note “specialists on both the NYSE and the AMEX are ….. required to provide 
continuous quotes.” 
9 They also argue that price process is not Markov since the market maker sets bid price and ask price by 
considering the trade size. 
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traders. However in a pooling equilibrium, the market marker cannot distinguish between 
traders and therefore, sets a spread at both large and small trade sizes. 
Do different trade sizes really matter? Several studies on block trading present 
interesting results. Holthausen et al (1987) report a permanent positive price effect that 
increases with block size for buyer-initiated block transactions only. Holthausen et al 
(1990) find significant permanent price effects for both buyer-initiated and seller-initiated 
block transactions. Easley and O’Hara (1987) introduce different trade sizes based on this 
idea and show that stock price recovers after the block sale in the presence of information 
uncertainty. However, block trading may bypass the market maker. In addition, a pooling 
equilibrium may exist in the market where large trade quantity conveys little or no 
information. This question is empirically answered in Easley et al (1997). 
In Easley et al (1997), a model very similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) is considered. Considering the market maker’s learning 
process is Bayesian, they show how the market maker calculates his bid and ask prices 
conditional on trade type. An interesting part of this study is that the authors form a 
likelihood function necessary to calculate the probability of informed trading. Another 
interesting part of this study is to model a similar likelihood function by considering 
different types of trade sizes into the market maker’s decision problem. Based on their 
empirical estimations, they conclude “trade size provides no information content beyond 
that conveyed by the underlying transactions”.10 This means informed traders trade both 
large and small quantities and therefore, only a pooling equilibrium exists in the spirit of 
Easley and O’Hara (1987). 
                                                 
10 Page 830 of Easley et al (1997). 
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It should be noted that Easley et al (1997)11 set out their model in a discrete time 
framework by considering binomial processes to model their likelihood function. 
However a binomial process approximates a Poisson process when 1) the number of 
observations is very large and 2) the success rate of an event is very small. This is indeed 
the case for most of the stocks traded in the stock exchanges: frequency is very high and 
the probability of any specific trade outcome at a particular time on a day is very low. For 
this reason, Easley et al (1996a and 1996b) consider buys and sells to follow one of 
independent three Poisson processes (for no-news, good-news and bad-news events) on 
each trading day. This method allows the authors to consider a continuous-time setting in 
their model. 
Another interesting part of Easley et al (1996a and 1996b) is that they calculate 
the probability of informed trading (PIN) by estimating necessary parameters from the 
likelihood function. This statistic gives a direct and convenient way to test asymmetric 
information of different samples of interest. Easley et al (1996a) report more information-
based trading in NYSE than in Cincinnati Stock Exchange. Easley et al (1996b) analyze 
active and infrequently traded stocks and finds higher risk of informed trading for less 
active stocks. If adverse selection cost is reflected in prices, it should explain returns of 
stocks at least to some extent. Easley et al (2002) document that PIN, used as a proxy for 
adverse selection costs, is significantly priced in the returns of stocks in addition to 
Fama-French (2002) three factors, i.e. market β, firm size and book-to-market ratio. They 
also report lower probability of informed trading for larger firms, a finding similar to 
those of several studies, e.g. Seyhun (1986), and Howe and Lin (1990), and the idea of 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988). 
                                                 
11 Easley and O’Hara (1992a, 1992b) also consider similar models.  
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These studies explain how asymmetric information induces spread in a market 
microstructure context. The empirical findings of these studies are very much in line with 
the results of Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986), Chiang and Venkatesh (1988), Howe and Lin 
(1990), Rozeff and Zaman (1988) etc. These studies report a positive relationship 
between the bid-ask spread and the expected losses to insiders. This indeed implies that 
the market considers the expected losses to insiders and adjusts market prices 
accordingly. This implies that any sampling criterion that strictly categorizes insiders and 
non-insiders should give us similar but more pronounced results with information-based 
market microstructure models. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Section 1 of this chapter makes it clear why a competitive market maker maintains a 
spread. In the absence of informed traders, he is likely to maintain a very low spread as 
uninformed traders do not know the future movements of stock prices and cannot make 
abnormal profit. However informed traders can predict the future movements of stock 
prices. They buy before the announcement of good news and sell before the 
announcement of bad news. Since the market maker does not have access to any special 
news, he systematically losses by trading with unidentified informed traders. To recoup 
his losses and stay in the business, the market maker maintains a spread. 
Several empirical studies, e.g. Seyhun (1986), report that some insiders have more 
inside information than others. In an effort to investigate which group can be categorized 
as the most informed traders, we present several theoretical and empirical studies. 
Individuals and families as controlling shareholders hold a substantial portion of the firm 
at the cost of having a less diversified portfolio, and hence they specialize their portfolio. 
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In addition, individuals and families are likely to hold their share in the long-run if the 
non-pecuniary private benefits are substantial. By considering these factors, i.e. portfolio 
specialization and potential amenities, we claim individuals and families to be the best 
informed traders to predict future movement of stock prices. Realizing this, the rational 
market maker is going to increase the spread for those stocks. Based on this discussion, 
we are motivated to test the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Average bid-ask spread of family-controlled firms is higher than that of 
widely-held firms. 
Hypothesis 2: PIN of family-controlled firms is higher than that of widely-held firms. 
Therefore, we expect to reject the null hypotheses presuming equality of spread 
and PIN across the two classes of firms in favour of the alternate hypothesis with PIN of 
family-controlled firms being higher than that of widely-held firms. 
Trading frequency is higher at the beginning and end of each trading day and 
thereby follows a U-shaped curve (see Lee and Ready (1991)). By considering one period 
per day, Easley et al (1996a, 1996b, 1997) essentially assume that trade arrival rates of 
informed and uninformed traders in the Poisson processes are constant all day. We want 
to test whether their assumption is empirically valid. 
A homogeneous Poisson process is characterized by its rate parameter λ, which is 
the expected number of "events" or "arrivals" that occur per unit time. In such a Poisson 
process, λ remains constant over time.12 If one day is considered as an event period, we 
therefore directly assume that arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders are 
constant throughout the day. The U-shaped trading frequency may imply multiple event 
periods. Motivated by this discussion, we test the following hypotheses. 
                                                 
12 see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisson_process 
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Hypothesis 3: Information events may occur multiple times throughout the trading day as 
opposed to only at the beginning of the day. 
Hypothesis 4: Arrival rates of uninformed traders change over time within a trading day. 
Hypothesis 5: Arrival rates of informed traders change over time within a trading day. 
We expect to reject null hypotheses that the probability of information events 
occurring later in the trading day is zero, and trader arrival rates are equal in different 
periods of the day. The U-shaped daily trading frequency sets grounds for the fourth and 
fifth hypotheses. However, we find no relevant study to form expectation on Hypothesis 
3 and therefore, we only remark that requiring information events to occur only at the 
beginning of any given trading day seems overly restrictive and is best left as an 
empirical question. 
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Chapter 3 
Sample Construction, Data Availability and Methodology 
This chapter discusses the sample construction, data availability, and methodology used 
in this study. Section 1 describes the procedures followed to form the two classes of 
firms. Section 2 details the intraday data availability of the sample firms. It also presents 
potential data problems and sets specific mechanisms to avoid such problems. Section 3 
discusses methodologies to test hypotheses of Chapter 2. We also consider a different 
formulation of PIN in this section, and based on this, we develop the hypothesis that our 
modified PIN is significantly less than the PIN of Easley et al (1996b). The last part of 
this section considers methodologies used to estimate parameters useful in PIN 
calculation. 
3.1 Sample Construction 
In this study, we use Canadian-based publicly traded firms cross-listed with U.S. 
exchanges over the period of 2004-05. We consider Canadian-based firms for the 
following reasons. Morck et al (1998) note that Canada and the U.S. have very similar 
endowments, technology, and human capital, but markedly different ownership structure 
of their largest firms. Many large publicly traded firms are owned by individuals, 
families, or groups of individuals in Canada whereas in the U.S. this ownership structure 
is relatively rare. We hand collect the cross-listed firms for every month from TSX 
Review and TSX E-Review13 over our sample period. We record a minimum of 183 
firms in January 2004 and a maximum of 252 firms in December 2005. The number of 
                                                 
13 Toronto Stock Exchange publishes this under the authority of the Board of Directors of TSX Group. We 
collected firm names from the “Interlisted Stocks” section. 
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cross-listed firms has an increasing trend over the sample period with the only 
exceptional month being January 2005. 
To classify whether a firm is family-controlled or widely-held, we use the 10% 
voting right rule of La Porta et al (1999). This threshold is sufficient to control the 
decision making process of a firm. In addition, several available databases report 
controlling shareholders from this level. It should be noted that finding specific 
ownership structures, e.g. pyramid structure as defined in La Porta et al (1999), is beyond 
the scope of this study. We simply track whether a firm has any controlling shareholder. 
If there is no controlling information, we record it as a widely-held company. However, if 
there is one or more controlling shareholders, we check whether any of the controlling 
shareholder(s) is an individual or are from the same family. We record firms as family-
controlled if we find individuals or family members as groups are the ultimate owners. 
Some companies may also be controlled by another company. In such situations, we track 
the ownership structure of the controlling company in the same way and define the 
ultimate ownership structure. Managers of Company A may jointly form a Private 
Company B to control Company A. We also categorize Company A as family-controlled 
in such situations. Private Company B may perform any business, e.g. manufacturing, 
investment advising, etc. 
We use 1) Financial Post (FP) Surveys of industrials (2003), Financial Post 
Surveys of Mines and Energy Resources (2003) and online FP Corporate Survey, 2) 
2004-05 Inter-corporate Ownership (ICO) CDs  provided by Statistics Canada, and 3) the 
U.S. Security Exchange Commission filings (schedule 13D and 13G, and 20F)14 to track 
                                                 
14 Firms file 13D (General Statement of Beneficial Ownership), 13G (Statements of Beneficial Ownership) 
and 20-F (Annual Reports) with the U.S. SEC. It should be mentioned that both 13D and 13G report 
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the ultimate ownership structure. Both FP surveys and ICO report significant ownership 
at and above 10% while the U.S. SEC filings require documentation from 5%. To avoid 
any error in classifying firms, we follow a stringent classification procedure (see Figure 
3.1 below) at the beginning of the sample period for each of the sample firms. 
Figure 3.1: Procedure to classify firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Check FP Check ICO 
If FP  & 
ICO   
match 
Record in the 
Database 
If FP  & 
ICO do not  
match 
Check relevant information 
in SEC filings: 13D, 13G and 
20K 
Or, if record 
not found in 
either FP or 
ICO 
 
Firms are thus classified as family-controlled or widely-held on January 1, 2004. 
We repeat the same procedure to classify firms on December 31, 2005. We find 162 
firms to have data for the entire sample period. Among these firms, 43 firms are found 
either to have altered their ownership status within the sample period or have undefined 
foreign ultimate owners that cannot be traced with the available database. In addition, 
some of the firms with altered ownership statuses have been acquired shortly after the 
event. As noted earlier, the existing literature implies that individuals, families or groups 
                                                                                                                                                 
beneficial ownership at and above 5% level. However these filings differ in some aspects. Schedule 13G is 
a shorter version of 13D. Schedule 13G can be filed instead of 13D when a firm’s beneficial owner 1) holds 
more than 5% but less than 20% of the voting power of any class of shares, 2) does not hold securities for 
controlling purpose (passive investors) and 3) is a registered financial institution. We observe that FP and 
ICO use information from both 13D and 13G. And several previous studies, e.g. La Porta et al (1999), use 
FP surveys. 
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retain control over firms only if they expect large potential amenities. We believe this 
will be the case if those controlling groups retain such power in the long-run. We expect 
a change in the controlling shareholding if retention of control is not profitable. This 
gives us reason to exclude those 43 firms from the main study. However, we do use some 
of these firms to conduct an event study involving a change of ownership event. From the 
remaining 119 firms, we find 64 (approx. 54%) widely-held and 55 (approx. 46%) 
family-controlled firms.  
3.2 Data Availability 
The market microstructure setup of the organized exchanges is different from that of 
over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Multiple market makers can be found in the OTC 
market. Different factors like less stringent regulations in the OTC market may also result 
in higher bid-ask spreads. For this obvious difference in the market setup, many studies, 
e.g. Seyhun (1986) and Howe and Lin (1990), consider investigating firms listed with 
NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ separately. Following these, we analyze the 38 firms that 
are listed only with NASDAQ separately. This results a sample size of 81 firms that are 
listed with either NYSE or AMEX. 
Of these 81 firms, we find 73 firms to have intraday trading data from the NYSE 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database for the entire two-year period. 44 widely-held and 29 
family-controlled firms listed with NYSE or AMEX form the ultimate samples for our 
main study. In addition to analyzing these two samples, we also investigate how the 
market maker forms the probability of informed trading for firms that were found to alter 
ownership status. We were able to find the exact dates of such events from 13D or 13G15 
of the U.S. SEC filings for 10 firms listed with NYSE/AMEX. Finally, 9 of the 10 firms 
                                                 
15 We consider the date listed in the “Date of Event Which Requires Filing of this Statement” section. 
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were found to have at least 60 days of intraday trading data around the event from TAQ 
database. 16
Several procedures have been considered to minimize data errors observed in 
NYSE TAQ database. These are: 
1. Motivated by a series of papers by Easley et al (1996a, 1996b, 1997) we assume that 
market makers quote bid and ask prices simultaneously. Therefore, we omit trades 
and quotes that exist before such meaningful quotes of a day (for example, those due 
to the opening auction process). We also exclude trades at the beginning of the day 
that occur at the midpoint price, i.e. average of ask and bid prices, and for which we 
cannot perform the tick test for the lack of previous trade prices (described in Section 
3). 
2. For the same reason, trades and quotes are omitted if either ask or bid price is equal to 
or less than zero. 
3. In the presence of informed traders, a positive spread must exist. Hence we omit 
trades and quotes if the spread is equal to or less than zero. We also exclude quotes if 
spread is greater than bid price. 
4. Furthermore to avoid misleading quotes, we exclude quotes with spread more than 
$5. Although the market maker is expected to increase the spread in an anticipation of 
informed trading, a spread greater than $5 is unreasonable for firms in our sample. 
Markets for securities with alarming level of adverse selection cost are halted by the 
authority. In addition, many studies, e.g. Chordia and Roll (2001), use this criterion. 
                                                 
16 Easley et al (1997) and Easley et al (2002) consider data for 60 trading days. Easley et al (2002) note, 
“the model can be estimated using as little as 60 trading days of data provided there is sufficient trading 
activity”. We find a lowest of 46 trades/day of these nine firms. 
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5. We assume that all market markers are competitive and quote similar bid and ask 
prices. Consequently, we only consider the best available bid and ask prices, i.e. 
highest price for bid and lowest price for ask. 
6. To avoid erroneous quotes and trades, we restrict successive bid and ask prices to 
change by less than 25%.17 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Bid-Ask Spread 
Our objective is to compare the average bid-ask spread for family-controlled and widely-
held firms. Spread is defined in many different ways. We analyze relative spread and 
effective spread in this study. Relative spread is defined as the following: 
{ }ask price bid price
mid price
−
. 
Here midpoint price is just the average of bid and ask prices. For consistency and 
to compare spreads of different firms, we calculate effective spreads as a percentage of 
midpoint prices as the following: 
2 × −Transaction price mid price
mid price
. 
We calculate average relative spreads and average effective spreads as the 
percentage of respective midpoint prices for all sample firms. Since we have different 
sample sizes for family-controlled and widely-held firms, we use the following statistic 
based on independent samples to test whether average relative spread and effective 
                                                 
17 Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index fell by 22% on Black Monday, October 19, 1987. Source: 
www.wikipedia.org. So it is unreasonable that successive prices change by more than 25% for firms we 
sample. 
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spread of family-controlled firms are significantly different from those of widely-held 
firms. 
Z x x
s
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n
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= −
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2 2
, 
where x FC  and xWH ,  and , and  and n  are sample means, variances, and 
sample sizes of family-controlled and widely-held firms. It should be mentioned that 
sample variances for both samples are expected to approximate population variance when 
 and n  are greater than thirty. Since the sample size of family-controlled firms is 
marginal, we also perform the normal approximation of the Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test (the Mann-Whitney Z). 
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The Mann-Whitney U test is based on two independent samples. The following 
steps are followed to calculate this test statistic. At first, we pool the observations of two 
samples and rank them in ascending order. We then sum up the ranks of the observations 
from the first sample. Let R1 be this sum. Then the Mann-Whitney U test statistic is 
( )
1
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21 2
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Here, n1 and n2 refer to the numbers of observations available for the first and second 
samples respectively. The Mann-Whitney approximates the normal distribution as both 
sample size increases. The approximation is adequate if each sample have at least 10 
observations. The normal approximation of the Mann-Whitney U test statistic is 
calculated as the following: 
U
UUZWhitneyMann σ
μ−=− , 
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where 
2
21nn
U =μ  and ( )12
121212 ++= nnnnUσ . 
For large Mann-Whitney Z statistic, we reject the null hypothesis that two population 
distributions have the same central location. Along with the standard Z test statistic, we 
use this Mann-Whitney Z extensively in our study.  
3.3.2 The Probability of Informed Trading 
In a series of papers, Easley et al (1996a, 1996b, 1997) develop a model that calculates 
quotes and the probability of informed trading. Because of the apparent importance of 
such model to the current study, a detailed explanation is provided. 
In a sequential trading model, traders trade a single stock with the market maker. 
At the end of the day, the asset has a value V , a random variable. The asset value 
conditional on good news is V  and conditional on bad news, it is V . The trading process 
is as follows: The market maker quotes bid and ask prices. Traders arrive at the trading 
post one by one and each has the opportunity to buy or sell one unit of asset. After each 
round of trading, the market maker is free to revise his quotes based on the information 
revealed by the trade. As a risk-neutral and competitive market maker, he continuously 
quotes and maintains zero expected profits during the trading day. He also knows the 
probabilistic structure of the arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders. Some 
traders, known as informed traders, have special information about the true asset value. 
An information event may occur at the beginning of the trading day (with a 
probability of α). If the information event occurs, the informed traders know whether it is 
bad (with probability δ) or good (with probability 1 – δ) news. If the information event is 
good news (bad news), competitive informed traders are assumed to arrive at the rate of µ 
and buy (sell) the stock with probability 1. Uninformed traders are not aware of the 
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information event and therefore, their arrival rate and the likelihood of buying or selling 
are independent of any information event. Assuming that they are equally likely to buy 
and sell, the arrival rate of uninformed buyers and sellers is ε regardless of the 
information event.18 In this setup, µ + ε and ε are the arrival rates for buyers and sellers 
on good-news days. Similarly, ε and µ + ε are the arrival rates for buyers and sellers on 
bad-news days. On days with no information event, only uninformed buyers and sellers 
arrive, so ε is the arrival rate for both buyers and sellers. 
According to Easley et al (1996a, 1996b), the market maker does not know 
whether it is going to be a good-, bad-, or no-news day at the beginning of the day. 
However he has information on the probability structures of parameters (α, δ, µ, ε) and 
believes that any of the three possible events may occur. He knows that good-, bad-, and 
no-news events occur with probabilities Pg(0) = α(1 – δ), Pb(0) = αδ, and Pn(0 ) = (1 – α) 
respectively. Considering this, he forms his bid and ask prices in the following way: 
b t E V t P t
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P t
P t
V E V t
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. 
Here μ ε μP t P tb ( ) [ ( )]+ b  refers to the probability of informed selling if it turns out to be a 
bad event day. Probability factor in the ask price can be explained similarly. Both bid and 
ask prices take the probability of informed trading into consideration. In the absence of 
informed traders, bid price equals ask price and the market maker does not revise his 
prices. On the other hand, bid and ask prices equal V  and V  respectively in the absence 
of uninformed traders. Considering the probabilities of both informed buying and selling, 
                                                 
18 Easley et al (1996a, 1997) consider equal buy and sell arrival rates for uninformed traders. They note “it 
seems a reasonable representation of noise trader behavior”.   
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and the fact that good and bad events are equally likely,19 the market maker easily finds 
the probability of informed trading (PIN) at the beginning of the day. 
Considering P t P t
PIN
g b( ) ( )= = = =
= +
0 0
2
δ
αμ
αμ ε
,
                                                
 
This is how PIN is defined in Easley et al (1996b). Before we proceed further, a 
more careful analysis of the tree diagram of the trading process of Easley et al (1996b) is 
warranted. The calculation of PIN can be derived in a simpler fashion from Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: Tree diagram of trade arrival rates20
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Note: Information event occurs with probability α. δ is the probability that the 
information event is bad news. Informed and uninformed traders arrive at µ and 2ε 
respectively. On good news days, buyers and sellers arrive at (ε + µ) and µ respectively. 
On bad news day, buyers and sellers arrive at ε and (ε + µ) respectively. On no news 
days, both traders arrive at ε. 
 
Let It denote informed trading at time t and n, g and b denote no-news, good-news and 
bad-news respectively. If Pr{Φ} is the probability of Φ, then, 
 
19 Easley et al (1996b) find that δ = 0.5 is a good approximation. See footnote 10 of Easley et al (1996b). 
20 This diagram is from Easley et al (1996b). 
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This apparent discrepancy in calculating the PIN may lead to different 
conclusions. If the value of α is very close to 0 or 1, the numerical values of both PINs 
would be similar, otherwise the modified PIN should be strictly smaller. However it is 
unlikely to find boundary values for α for most, if not all, of the NYSE and AMEX firms 
since information events occur sporadically. Hence, we empirically investigate in this 
study whether our formulation of PIN is significantly less than the conventional PIN 
calculation. We test for the difference between the means of the two PIN calculations 
(matched pairs) by using the t test (on the difference of matched pairs), and the normal 
approximation of the Wilcoxon non-parametric test (the Wilcoxon Z). It should be 
mentioned that the normal approximation is adequate for thirty or more observations. 
Based on this discussion, we develop the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: The modified PIN is less than the PIN defined by Easley et al (1996b). 
As before, we test this by attempting to reject the null hypothesis that the two 
PINs are equal against a one-tailed alternative. Easley et al (1996a, 1996b, 1997) develop 
a likelihood function that can be used to estimate the parameter vector θ = (α, δ, µ, ε). We 
should also note that PIN, as a measurement of asymmetric information cost, is a function 
of three estimated parameters, α, µ and ε. Therefore, for similar α and µ, and different ε, 
it is very likely to get very different probability of informed trading.  
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Simple comparative statics shows that for a small change in α, both conventional 
and modified PIN increases. 
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For a change in α, modified PIN increases more than the conventional PIN given α is 
close to one. However, conventional PIN increases more than our modified PIN for α 
close to zero. Further analysis shows that both PINs decrease with ε and increase with µ, 
which is expected in these models. 
For a review of the model, our discussion follows by explaining the likelihood 
function on a no-event day. Since only uninformed traders trade on such days, arrival 
rates of both buyers and sellers are the same. Considering a continuous-time framework, 
all of the arrival rates follow independent Poisson distributions. Therefore the likelihood 
function of observing B buys and S sells during total time, T, of a no-event trading day is: 
e T
B
e T
S
T
B
T
S− −ε εε ε
! !
. 
 
Similar likelihoods can be formed for a good-news day and a bad-news day. B 
buys and S sells follow any of the three Poisson processes each day. Since there is 
uncertainty regarding the information event in a particular day, a weighted average of 
good-, bad- and no-news day likelihood functions are considered with their respective 
probabilities, α(1 – δ), αδ, and (1 – α), to form the following daily likelihood function: 
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This is the likelihood function the market forms for a particular day. Since the 
days are considered independent, the likelihood function over I days will be the product 
of daily likelihoods: 
L M L B S
i
I
i i( ) ( ,θ θ= ∏=1 )
                                                
. 
We maximize this likelihood function to estimate the parameter vector θ and therefore 
calculate the PIN for both of our samples. One of our objectives is to test whether 
different trade arrival rates on a trading day imply different information events. Since the 
assumption that information events occur only once before each trading day is an 
abstraction [Easley et al (1997)], we consider two-event periods (before and after 1:00 
pm) and three-event periods within a trading day (before 11:00 am, from 11:00 am to 
2:30 pm and after 2:30 pm).21 Otherwise, we consider the same assumptions of the model 
presented. 
 To compare whether PIN of family-controlled firms is significantly different from 
that of widely-held firms, we use the Mann-Whitney Z test. We also use the normal 
approximation to a similar non-parametric test, namely the Wilcoxon test, to investigate 
whether PINs of any sample are significantly different across different periods of trading 
days. The Wilcoxon test is based on matched sample sizes whereas the Mann-Whitney 
test is based on different sample sizes. 
 
21 As stated earlier, these event periods are classified in the spirit of Lee and Ready’s (1991) observation. 
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We also conduct an event study approach to analyze the PINs of family-controlled 
and widely-held firms in Section 4.5. We find only 9 firms with the minimal requirement 
of data to alter their ownership status during our sample period. Since only these firms 
are considered in the event study, we cannot use the Wilcoxon Z test statistic. Rather, we 
use the Wilcoxon T test statistic. Like other non-parametric tests, the Wilcoxon test is 
based on rankings. At first, we take the absolute difference of the observation of two 
matched samples. After discarding pairs that have zero differences, we rank the rest in 
ascending order. The ranks for positive and negative differences are summed separately. 
The Wilcoxon T is the smaller of these sums. If the sums of the ranks for positive and 
negative differences are very different, we would be suspicious of the null hypothesis that 
the differences are centered around zero. Therefore for very low value of the T statistic, 
we reject the hypothesis. 
When there are more than 20 non-zero matched pair differences, the normal 
distribution approximates the Wilcoxon T. For convenience, we term this normal 
approximation as the Wilcoxon Z. This is calculated as 
T
TTZWilcoxon σ
μ−= , 
where ( )
4
1+= nnTμ  and ( )( )24
1212 ++= nnnTσ . For a large Wilcoxon Z test statistic, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the population differences are centered around zero. 
So far we have illustrated two non-parametric tests, namely the Mann-Whitney 
test and the Wilcoxon test. The Wilcoxon test can be employed for two samples having 
equal number of observations. In contrast, the Mann-Whitney test is appropriate when we 
have two independent samples with different numbers of observations. We also face 
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situations where we need to compare three samples, e.g. PIN of family-controlled firms 
across first, second and third sessions. In such situation, we use the Kruskal-Wallis test 
statistic. We explain below how this test statistic is calculated. 
Let n1, n2 and n3 denote the numbers of observations of three samples. Like other 
non-parametric tests, we at first pool observations of all samples (denoted by n) and rank 
them in ascending order. We denote R1, R2 and R3 the sum of ranks of the first, second 
and third samples. Then we calculate the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic as the following. 
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This test statistic follows a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. For a large test 
statistic, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of the three population means. 
3.3.3 Trade Classification 
To estimate the parameters from the likelihood function, we must know the trade types, 
e.g. buys or sells. NYSE TAQ database has information on quotes and trades. However, 
it does not contain trade classification records. 
Lee and Ready (1991) analyze the tick test, reverse tick test, and quote rule for 
trade classification. In the tick test, trades can be classified into four categories, namely 
uptick, zero uptick, downtick and zero downtick. If the current trade price is higher 
(lower) than the previous trade price, the trade is referred to as uptick (downtick). Since 
buying pressure induces an increase in trade price, trades at upticks are considered buys. 
Similarly, trades at downtick are sells. If consecutive trade prices are the same, the trade 
is classified as the previous one. If the previous trade is uptick (downtick), the current 
trade is classified as zero uptick (zero downtick). Zero upticks and zero downticks are 
categorized as buys and sells respectively. Every trade is classified in this way. In this 
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procedure, a trade is classified by comparing the current price movement relative to the 
price of the previous one. The reverse tick test follows an opposite algorithm: it classifies 
trades by comparing the current trade price change to the price of the next trade. Lee and 
Ready (1991) report that the tick test outperforms the reverse tick test. 
Lee and Ready (1991) also document that it is likely to find most of the current 
trade prices within the concurrent bid-ask spreads since trades are recorded after quotes. 
They document that quotes that are at least 5 seconds old (effective quotes) better 
correspond to current trade prices. This 5 second delay arises from a delay in recording 
trade data. 
Easley et al (1996a, 1996b, 2002 etc.) combine the tick test and quote rule of Lee 
and Ready (1991) to classify trades. According to the quote rule, trades are considered 
buys (sells) if they occur above (below) the midpoint of effective quotes. However trades 
may also occur at midpoints. Classification of these trades follows the tick test – if 
positive price change is found in consecutive trades, we classify the trade as buy and 
otherwise sell. Although there is a possibility of misclassification, we follow this 
procedure as it is standard and widely accepted in the literature [Easley et al (2002)]. 
3.3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Easley et al (1996a, 1996b) finds the likelihood function to be well-behaved in empirical 
analysis. However, we find a problem in estimating the likelihood function with Poisson 
distribution for firms with very high daily average arrival rates using the same 
structure.22 To circumvent this situation, we use the normal approximation to the Poisson 
process. For very large values of Poisson rate (λ), N ~ normal(λ, λ2) is an excellent 
                                                 
22 With standard spreadsheet software, the Poisson process shows error for very high daily average arrival 
rates. 
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approximation of the Poisson process. Furthermore, N ~ normal(λ, λ2) is a good 
approximation of the Poisson distribution if λ > 10 and a continuity correction is 
performed. If x is a non-negative integer, then P(X ≤ x) is replaced with P(X ≤ x + 0.5) 
for the continuity correction.23 Consequently, we estimate the likelihood function 
considering either Poisson or normal distribution. For more accurate estimation, we 
consider λ > 20 the cut-off point to determine which distribution to follow. 
 Moreover, the likelihood function over I days is defined as the product of daily 
likelihoods. To help numerical stability for the maximization, we consider the natural 
logarithm of the likelihood function. 
In the likelihood function, α and δ are the probabilities of information event and 
bad news respectively and, therefore, their values should be bounded within 0 and 1. In 
addition, arrival rates ε and μ cannot be negative. We estimate unconstrained parameters 
– a, d, e and m – with different initial values by maximizing the likelihood function and 
then transform those values to α, δ, ε and μ respectively.24 Different initial values are 
used to avoid local maximization. 
 We put restrictions in the likelihood function to measure whether the estimated 
parameters in the morning is significantly different from those in the afternoon. For 
example, to test whether αm (information event before 1:00 pm) is significantly different 
from αa (information event after 1:00 pm) we put αm = αa as the restriction. If the 
restriction is in fact true, then lnLR is not expected to be significantly less than lnRU. It 
may be noted that the LR test statistic, 2{ln(LR)-ln(LU)}, asymptotically follows a chi-
                                                 
23 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisson_distribution 
24 Transformation method: α = exp(a)/{1+exp(a)}, δ = exp(d)/{1+exp(d)}, ε = exp(e) and μ = exp(m) 
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squared (χ2) distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, here 
for example, 1. 
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Chapter 4  
Empirical Findings 
Our main objective is to investigate the PINs of family-controlled and widely-held firms. 
However, some of the assumptions used by Easley et al (1996a, 1996b) to calculate the 
PIN are quite strong. In the previous chapters, we outlined that information events may 
not only occur at the beginning of the day. In addition, trading frequency for frequently 
traded stocks follows a U-shaped curve. Based on this discussion, we consider multiple 
periods within trading days. We estimate the likelihood function by considering the entire 
day as one period, as two periods, and as three periods. We present the findings 
separately based on the number of daily periods. We also consider an event study about 
the event that a firm changes its ownership structure in this chapter. 
4.1 Analysis of Spread 
A primary motivation of this study was to analyze whether the average relative spread 
and the average effective spread as a percentage of midpoint price of family-controlled 
firms are higher than those of widely-held firms. Table 4.1 on the next page reports the 
findings on Canadian firms cross-listed with NYSE/AMEX. The Mann-Whitney Z test is 
performed since sample size of family-controlled firms is marginally less than 30. We 
find all test statistics to be significant for relative spread. In addition, the average relative 
spread of family-controlled firms is higher than that of widely-held ones. This provides 
enough evidence in favour of our first hypothesis. Therefore, we do not reject the first 
hypothesis that the average spread is higher for family-controlled firms. However, we 
find confounding results when effective spread is considered. Though the average 
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effective spread of family-controlled firms is higher than that of widely-held ones, none 
of the test statistics are significant at even 5% significance level.  
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics and Hypothesis Testing of Spread 
 
Statistics Relative spread as a % of midpoint price 
 Effective spread as a 
% of midpoint price 
Mean, x  
x FC  = 1.602 
xWH  = 0.885 
 x FC  = 0.655 
xWH  = 0.581 
sFC  = 0.019 
sWH  = 0.008 
 sFC  = 0.007 
sWH  = 0.006 
Standard deviation,  s
nFC  = 29 
nWH  = 44 
 nFC  = 29 
nWH  = 44 
Sample size, n 
Hypothesis testing x FC  = xWH  
Z statistic (large sample) 
 
1.915**  0.472 
Mann-Whitney Z statistic 
 
2.108**  1.026 
Null hypothesis of x FC  = xWH  is tested for both spread calculations. *** and ** depict 
significance of test statistics at 1% and 5% level respectively. Z statistic of 1.915 is 
significant at or above 2.81% level. 
 
Effective spread is calculated by deducting the midpoint price from the 
transaction price. This calculation effectively reduces the actual spread, a fact that is 
evident from the above table, and consequently, may not capture the desired information 
effect since trades within the quotes may come from traders who can credibly claim to be 
uninformed. 
We should also note that bid-ask spread considers asymmetric information cost 
and the cost of immediacy and trading. In the literature review Chapter (Section 3), we 
argued that individuals or families hold substantial ownership of a firm at the expense of 
a less diversified portfolio and hence, specialize their portfolios. Since these controlling 
groups are better informed, the market maker faces substantial losses by trading with 
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them. To recoup these losses from the uninformed traders, he maintains a higher spread. 
The analysis on bid-ask spread statistically shows that the market maker maintains a 
higher spread for family-controlled firms. But, which cost is causing the spread of 
family-controlled firms to be higher is not clear (most of the family-controlled and 
widely-held stocks in our sample are frequently traded, and therefore, illiquidity should 
not be of much concern). In the following sections, we therefore analyze whether higher 
spread of family-controlled firms is caused by the asymmetric information cost. 
4.2 One Period per Day – A Conventional Approach 
Considering a day as a period, we restrict disclosure of any information event during the 
rest of the day. In addition, arrival rates for the entire day are supposed to be constant in 
the independent Poisson processes. Later in this study, we explore whether these 
assumptions have any serious consequences. One point of interest is to see whether total 
number of buys and sells approximates the total number of informed and uninformed 
traders. We present in Table 4.2 the summary statistics of buys and sells along with 
informed and uninformed trading for this purpose. We find that the total amount of 
informed and uninformed trading is higher than the total number of buys and sells in both 
family-controlled and widely-held cases (one would expect αµ + 2ε to be equal to the 
sum of the averages of buys and sells). For interested readers, we enclose the firm-wise 
statistics in Appendix 1. It should be noted that the averages of alpha and delta for 
family-controlled firms are 0.249 and 0.333 respectively whereas they are 0.277 and 
0.293 respectively for widely-held firms. This implies that the market maker perceives, 
on an average, an alpha of 0.249 for family-controlled firms. He also perceives with 
probability of 0.333 that the information event is bad news. In case the trading day turns  
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of buys and sells with informed and uninformed  
trading 
 
 Family-controlled firms  Widely-held firms 
Sample Statistics Buys Sells  Buys Sells 
Minimum 2.024 2.058  2.990 2.950 
Maximum 1,365.454 1,178.618  1,613.022 1,544.712 
Mean 219.399 187.826  381.837 321.215 
Standard Deviation 302.819 260.710  432.490 367.192 
 
Estimates 
 
Epsilon 
 
Mu 
  
Epsilon 
 
Mu 
Minimum 1.942 8.913  1.973 7.596 
Maximum 1,000.865 745.152  1,163.842 875.335 
Mean 177.387 184.337  287.931 307.531 
Standard Deviation 228.929 168.827  301.230 247.014 
Note: Epsilon and mu refer to uninformed and informed trading respectively. 
out to be a bad-news day, the market maker also predicts for an average family-controlled 
firm that a total of 539 trades, 184 of which are informed, are likely to occur. Since 
informed traders know about the bad news, they will only sell whereas uninformed 
traders are equally likely to buy and sell. Presumably the market maker makes more 
specific forecasts for individual firms. Similar explanation can be illustrated for widely-
held firms. 
To formally analyze whether the higher spread of family-controlled firms is 
induced by the asymmetric information cost, we compare PINs of family-controlled and 
widely-held firms. If the market maker observes a higher level of information asymmetry 
for family-controlled firms, we expect 1) the average PINFC to be higher than the average 
PINWH and 2) the test statistics to be large enough to reject the null hypothesis, i.e. reject 
PINFC = PINWH in favour of the alternative hypothesis, PINFC > PINWH. 
Based on the PINs presented in Appendix 2, we calculate the average and 
standard deviation of PINs of family-controlled and widely-held firms in Table 4.3. Two 
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main findings of the descriptive statistics are 1) average modified PIN of family-controll 
ed firms is not higher than that of widely-held firms and 2) numerical values of the modi- 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics and Hypothesis testing of PINs – One Period per Day 
 
Statistics  Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b)    
Mean, x  0.166 0.163 
Standard deviation,  s 0.082 0.064 
Sample size, n 29 44 
Modified PIN   
Mean, x  0.103 0.111 
Standard deviation,  s 0.030 0.037 
Sample size, n 29 44 
Z statistic (large sample) Mann-Whitney Z statistic 
Hypothesis testing 
PIN PINFC WH=  PIN PINFC WH=  
PIN: Easley et al (1996b) 0.159 0.653 
Modified PIN 0.947 0.496 
No test statistic is significant at 5% level. Every firm has 500 trading days for the 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
fied PIN calculation are lower than the conventional PIN calculation. The second finding 
implies that information events occur after sporadic intervals and therefore, its 
probability, α, empirically satisfies 0 < α < 1 (strong form of inequality). Since the 
modified PIN does not consider multiplying α with μ in the denominator, we later 
perform a formal test to verify whether the modified PIN calculation is less than the PIN 
developed by Easley et al (1996b). 
We perform the Mann-Whitney test in addition to the Z test to verify the null 
hypothesis for two reasons.25 These are 1) we do not know the exact distribution of the 
estimated parameters and 2) sample size of family-controlled firms is less than 30, which 
is marginal. For low Mann-Whitney Z test statistics, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the PIN of family-controlled firms is equal to that of widely-held firms for both 
                                                 
25 We perform several non-parametric tests in the later sections of this study for the same reasons. 
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methods of PIN calculations. The support for the null hypothesis, in turn, provides 
evidence against Hypothesis 2. 
Testing the null hypothesis necessarily involves accurate model specification. 
Considering this, any hypothesis testing involves a joint test of the null hypothesis and 
the underlying model specification. The PIN estimations assuming information event 
only at the beginning of the trading day and constant arrival rates throughout the day may 
not be good approximations if those assumptions are not empirically valid. In addition, 
constant arrival rates of uninformed and informed traders throughout the whole day is 
very implausible given the U-shaped trading frequency typically observed and the market 
efficiency doctrine. For these reasons, we consider several periods within each trading 
day in an effort to get more accurate PINs. An economic interpretation of the findings of 
Table 4.3 is contingent on the empirical validity of the assumptions. 
4.3 Two Periods per Day 
Informed traders will trade following an information event at the beginning of the day. 
The market maker does not know whether such an event has occurred. Accordingly, he 
forms his prior belief by considering all events, i.e. good news, bad news, and no news. 
Trade begins and the Bayesian market maker updates his belief based on trade type and 
arrival rates. In an ideal efficient market, it should not take long for the Bayesian market 
maker to identify the presence of informed traders and update the quotes to avoid losses 
from the informed traders. On the other hand, competitive informed traders have the 
incentive to trade before the market maker realizes their presence. Therefore, the 
assumption of constant informed trade arrival rate is unlikely to be valid. In addition, we 
may allow considering two types of information events in the same day, for example 
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good news in the morning and bad news in the afternoon. For stocks with frequent 
information events or high values of α, the likelihood function may treat these arrival 
rates as noise trades. These concerns motivate us to consider two or three periods within 
each trading day. 
4.3.1 General Findings 
We analyze whether information events, news type, informed arrival rates and 
uninformed arrival rates are the same for the two periods over our sample period before 
comparing PINs of family-controlled and widely-held firms. We term the first half 
(before 1:00 pm) and second half (after 1:00 pm) of trading days as morning and 
afternoon respectively for convenience. At first, we analyze family-controlled firms. 
It is obvious form Table 4.4 on the next page that arrival rates of both noise 
traders and informed traders differ across morning and afternoon sessions. For at least 25 
firms, null hypotheses of equal rates of informed and uninformed traders are strongly 
rejected by large likelihood ratio test statistics. We find strong evidence in favour of 
Hypotheses 4 and 5. This suggests that the intensity parameter λ in the Poisson process 
changes over time. Since this is not valid for homogeneous Poisson processes, we are 
motivated to segregate each trading day into several periods. This allows us to get 
constant rate parameters within each period, but it allows the rate to change between 
periods. This particular statistical finding casts serious doubt on the results presented in 
Table 4.3 and, more generally on studies that consider whole trading days as independent 
event periods. 
The joint hypothesis of equal information event and types of information event 
probabilities (αM = αA, δM = δA) is found to be significantly different for 45% of family-  
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Table 4.4: Test of Similar Parameters across Two Periods for Individual Family-
Controlled Firms 
 
Family-Controlled Firms 
Null Hypotheses Firm 
Symbol αM = αA δM = δA
αM = αA, 
δM = δA
εM = εA μM = μA
αM = αA, δM = δA, 
εM = εA, εM = εA
ABY ***  *** *** *** *** 
AGT    *** *** *** 
BVF    *** *** *** 
BPO    *** *** *** 
CFK *   *** *** *** 
GIB    *** *** *** 
FLI    **  * 
CBJ    *** *** *** 
CWG ***  ***  *** ** 
CLS  ** ** *** *** *** 
CEF ***  ** *** *** *** 
CJR *** *** *** ***  ** 
DTC **  ** *** *** *** 
FFH    *** *** *** 
FS    ***  *** 
GG  ** * *** *** *** 
HBG    *** *** *** 
LGF  *** ** *** *** *** 
MIM ***  *** *** *** *** 
MGA    *** *** *** 
MNG    *** *** *** 
PAL    *** *** *** 
OPY ***  *** ** *** *** 
PPK *** ** *  *** ** 
IQW *** * *** ***  ** 
RIC *** *** *** *** *** *** 
RG    *** *** *** 
SJR    *** *** *** 
TOC    *** *** *** 
*, ** and *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Subscripts M and A represent periods before and after 1:00 pm of trading days. We use the 
LR test statistic to test whether the restrictions are in fact true. For large LR test statistics, 
we reject the null hypotheses. We reject αM = αA for 38% of firms at 10%, δM = δA for 
24% of firms at 10%, εM = εA for 93% of firms at 5% and μM = μA for 86% of firms at 
10%. We also reject the joint hypothesis of all restrictions for 97% of firms at 5% level. 
For 45% of firms, information event and information type are found to be different for 
morning and afternoon periods at 10% level. Every firm has 1,000 trading periods for the 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
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controlled firms. This finding is consistent with information events occurring only at the 
beginning of the trading day. If this is indeed the case, the rejection of similar informed 
trading rates in the morning and afternoon sessions is not surprising considering the 
market efficiency doctrine. However, we also find enough evidence to reject similar trade 
arrival rates of uninformed traders for 93% of family-controlled firms for the morning 
and afternoon sessions.26 In addition, we find similar level of information events (α) for 
approximately 62% of family-controlled firms. Since similar level of information events 
are expected only if information event occurs within the trading day, we find strong 
evidence to support Hypothesis 3 that information events may occur more than once per 
day. To analyze this hypothesis formally, we directly test whether αM and αA are greater 
than zero. We present the results in Table A4.1 of Appendix 4. For all family-controlled 
and widely-held firms, we reject the null hypothesis that α = 0 at 1% significance level.27 
A simple counter explanation of these findings would be that our results are sample  
Table 4.5: Test of Similar Parameters across Two Periods for Individual Widely-
Held Firms 
 
Widely-Held Firms 
Null Hypotheses Firm 
Symbol αM = αA δM = δA
αM = αA, 
δM = δA
εM = εA μM = μA
αM = αA, δM = δA, 
εM = εA, εM = εA
AZK     *** ** 
BMO    *** *** *** 
BNS    *** *** *** 
BGO    *** *** *** 
BEL ** *** *** *** *** *** 
CGT    *** *** *** 
HCH *** *** *** *** *** *** 
CCJ    *** *** *** 
                                                 
26 Since we divided the trade day into two periods that have different lengths, we perform a similar 
maximum likelihood procedure by putting appropriate weights to those sessions. The three left most 
columns in Table 4.4 and 4.5 consider appropriate weights to conduct the LR test. 
27 We also test similar hypothesis for one- and three-periods. Results are presented in Table A4.2 and A4.3 
of Appendix 4. 
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CNQ    *** *** *** 
CM ***  *** **  ** 
CNI    *** *** *** 
CP **  * *** *** *** 
KRY     *** ** 
EGO    *** *** *** 
ENB    ***  *** 
ERF *** *** *** *** *** *** 
EENC  *** *** *** *** *** 
FHR    *** *** *** 
GRS    *** *** *** 
GSS **  ** *** *** *** 
GBN    *** *** *** 
IAG **  * *** *** *** 
IMO    ** *** *** 
N    ***  ** 
IDR    *** *** *** 
IPS    *** *** *** 
KFS **  **  * * 
MFC    *** *** *** 
MRB    *** *** *** 
NCX  *  *** *** *** 
NXG    *** *** *** 
PMU    *** *** *** 
PTF *** *** *** *** *** *** 
PDG    *** *** *** 
PVX *** *** *** *** *** *** 
RY  ** ** *** *** *** 
SLF    *** *** *** 
SU    *** *** *** 
TU *   *** *** *** 
TLM    *** *** *** 
TAC    *** *** *** 
TRP *      
TGA *   *** *** *** 
ZL  *** ** *** *** *** 
*, ** and *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Subscripts M and A represent periods before and after 1:00 pm of a trading day. We use 
the LR test statistic to test whether the restrictions are in fact true. For large LR test 
statistics, we reject the null hypotheses. We reject αM = αA for 30% of firms at 10%, δM = 
δA for 20% of firms at 10%, εM = εA for 91% of firms at 1% and μM = μA for 88% of 
firms at 5%. For 30% of firms, information event and information type are found to be 
different for morning and afternoon periods at 10% level. We also reject the joint 
hypothesis of all restrictions for 95% of firms at 1% level. Every firm has 1,000 trading 
periods for maximum likelihood estimation. 
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specific. Therefore, we analyze 44 widely-held firms, the results of which are presented 
in Table 4.5. 
Needless to say, our findings of widely-held firms in Table 4.5 confirm that our 
results of the family-controlled firms are not sample specific. Arrival rates of informed 
and uninformed traders are significantly different for 88% and 91% of firms respectively 
across morning and afternoon sessions. We also reject αM = αA for 30% of the widely-
held firms. This means 70% of the widely-held firms have statistically similar probability 
of information events for morning and afternoon sessions. For the same reasons discussed 
earlier, we reject Hypothesis 3, i.e. information events occur only at the beginning of the 
day, for 70% of widely-held firms. The joint hypothesis considering all restrictions is 
rejected for 43 out of 44 firms and therefore, presents strong evidence that assumptions 
together are not empirically valid to estimate parameters in Easley et al (1996a, 1996b). 
These findings confirm our suspicion about the findings of Table 4.3 and provide a basis 
to consider two periods within every trading day to estimate PINs of different firms. 
Based on this explanation, we now turn to comparing PINs of family-controlled firms to 
those of widely-held firms. 
4.3.2 Family-Controlled Firms versus Widely-Held Firms 
Tables A5.1 and A5.2 of Appendix 5 contain estimated PINs of family-controlled and 
widely-held firms considering two periods per trading day. Before analyzing PIN of 
family-controlled and widely-held firms, we present the summary statistics of the 
different parameters in Table 4.6. 
One of the important observations is that both informed and uninformed trader 
arrival rates are higher for widely-held firms. One explanation for this is that widely-held 
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firms are far greater in size and therefore have higher trading volume than family-
controlled firms. Another potential explanation follows the idea and finding of Jiang and 
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics of Parameters (Two Periods) 
 
Statistics Morning Session Afternoon Session 
 Family-controlled
Widely-
held 
Family-
controlled 
Widely-
held 
Alpha (α)     
Mean 0.299 0.264 0.317 0.279 
Standard Deviation 0.218 0.131 0.213 0.141 
Epsilon (ε)     
Mean 101.105 172.278 84.941 133.798 
Standard Deviation 139.600 185.286 108.848 138.818 
Mu (µ)     
Mean 127.104 215.373 104.865 167.024 
Standard Deviation 138.954 190.000 114.786 141.797 
Percentage of Informed 
Traders (conditional on α) 
38.883 38.515 38.435 38.495 
We calculate the percentage of informed trader by dividing the average of informed 
traders by the sum of the average of informed and average of uninformed traders. 
 
Kim (2005). Widely-held firms have large institutional shareholding and therefore are 
covered by more analysts. As a result, those stocks are more actively traded. Also 
important to note is that the percentage of informed traders is very similar for family-
controlled and widely-held firms. Another interesting observation of Table 4.6 is that 
substantially more informed trading occurs in the morning session. This may be the 
consequence of heavy trading induced by the market clearing at the beginning of the 
trading day. For most stocks, we observe a U-shaped trading pattern that is tilted to the 
left (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2 of Section 4.4). 
For both morning and afternoon sessions, the market maker perceives on average 
a higher probability of information events occurring, α, for family-controlled firms. In 
addition, α is higher in the afternoon session for both samples. If information events 
occur only at the beginning of the day, we expect the market maker to maintain a lower α 
 52
for sessions that start considerably after the beginning the day. As a competitive market 
marker, he should recognize the occurrence of any information event soon after the trade 
begins. On the other hand, informed traders have to trade profitably before the market 
maker realizes their presence. These arguments support perceiving a lower probability of 
information events for afternoon sessions if the assumption that information events occur 
only at the beginning of the day is true. The higher α in afternoon sessions (along with 
the results in Appendix 4, which is based on tests that formally set α = 0) provides 
considerable evidence in favour of Hypothesis 3 that information events may occur more 
than once per day. 
Now we test whether the equality of similar PINs for family-controlled and 
widely-held firms holds, the results of which are presented in Table 4.7 (basen on 
Appendix 5). We find consistent results from Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. Higher PINFC and 
PINWH of the afternoon sessions in Table 4.7 are direct consequences of higher level of αF 
in Table 4.6. This is consistent with the comparative analysis described in the literature 
review section. 
We outlined in the literature review section that individuals or families as 
controlling shareholders are better informed. Since the market maker losses by trading 
with them, asymmetric information cost (and therefore the PIN) of family-controlled 
firms is expected to be higher than that of widely-held firms. However, we find the 
average PIN of widely-held firms to be higher than the average PIN of family-controlled 
firms for both ways of PIN calculation. In addition, there is enough evidence at the 5% 
significance level to reject the null hypothesis that PINFC and PINWH are similar as far as 
the morning session is concerned. This implies significantly lower PINFC than PINWH in 
 53
the morning session, a fact that provides evidence against Hypothesis 2. It should be 
mentioned that the exact distributions of the estimated parameters, which are used to 
calculate 
Table 4.7: Test of Equality of PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms 
(Two Periods)  
 
  
PINM: 
Easley et al 
(1996b) 
Modified 
PINM
PINA: Easley 
et al (1996b) 
Modified 
PINA
Family-Controlled Firms    
Mean 0.122 0.080 0.130 0.086 
Standard Deviation 0.056 0.036 0.060 0.037 
Sample size 29 29 29 29 
 
Widely-Held Firms     
Mean 0.149 0.098 0.155 0.101 
Standard Deviation 0.044 0.029 0.050 0.034 
Sample Size 44 44 44 44 
Hypothesis testing PINFC = PINWH
Z test statistic 2.215** 2.340*** 1.826** 1.772** 
Mann-Whitney Z 2.108** 2.255** 1.860** 1.420 
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% level respectively. PINM and PINA 
refer to the PIN of the morning session and afternoon session respectively. 
 
PIN, are unknown. In addition, sample size of family-controlled firms is marginal. 
Consequently, we use the Mann-Whitney Z test. Both statistics for the morning session 
improve when the modified PIN is calculated. However, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of PINFC = PINWH for low Mann-Whitney Z statistic when afternoon session 
is considered. In addition, test statistics for the modified PIN for the afternoon session are 
lower than PIN calculation of Easley et al (1996b). Is the modified PIN significantly 
different from PIN calculated in Easley et al (1996b)? We investigate this question in 
more detail shortly. What we find from this section is that there is strong evidence to 
reject Hypothesis 2 for both sessions. 
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Our findings are quite interesting. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
studies has considered multiple periods within trading days for the likelihood estimation. 
We find evidence in favour of multiple information-event occurrences within trading 
days. In addition, we find PINFC to be significantly lower than PINWH in the morning 
session only. Is a very low PINFC in the morning session driving our results? In an 
attempt to reconcile the confounding results and provide an economic explanation to the 
findings of Table 4.7, we analyze whether the PINs of our whole sample and individual 
samples are different across different sessions in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Test of Equality of PINs across Two Periods 
 
Hypothesis testing PINM = PINA
 t statistic Wilcoxon Z 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b)   
Total sample (73 firms) -3.649*** -3.054*** 
Family-controlled firms -3.618*** -3.038*** 
Widely-held firms -2.170** -1.575 
Modified PIN   
Total sample (73 firms) -2.978*** -2.422*** 
Family-controlled firms -3.449*** -2.800*** 
Widely-held firms -1.414 -0.794 
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% respectively. t statistics are based on 
matched samples and has (n-1) degrees of freedom. t statistic assumes population 
distribution of the sample differences, here (PINM – PINA), to be normal. Since this 
may not be true, we use the distribution-free Wilcoxon test statistic. 
 
Low test statistics confirm that the Bayesian market maker does not form 
significantly different PINs for the morning and afternoon sessions for widely-held firms, 
but family-controlled firms do have significantly different PINs for morning and 
afternoon. The magnitude of the difference is strong enough to reject the null hypothesis 
of similar PINs across different sessions for the whole sample. This essentially helps us 
explain our earlier finding about why the PINFC is significantly lower than the PINWH for 
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the morning session only. Based on the descriptive statistics of Table 4.7 and test 
statistics of Table 4.8, we conclude that the market maker maintains a very low PIN for 
family-controlled firms in the morning session only. In fact, this is causing the PINFC to 
be lower than PINWH. But, why does the market maker perceive very low PINFC for the 
morning session? Though we do not attempt to analyze this issue completely, our 
findings on α, ε and µ, outlined in Table 4.9, may explain this to some extent. 
Table 4.9: Test of Equality of Parameters across Two Periods for Samples 
Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms Hypotheses t statistics Wilcoxon Z t statistics Wilcoxon Z 
αM = αA -2.289** -1.890** -1.363 -0.507 
εM = εA  2.428*** -4.076*** 5.015*** -5.777*** 
µM = µA  3.843*** -3.471*** 5.803*** -5.112*** 
*** and ** represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The critical 
value of 1.890 is 2.94%. 
 
For morning and afternoon sessions, the market maker perceives significantly 
different arrival rates of informed and uninformed trading for both family-controlled and 
widely-held firms. However, he perceives different probabilities of information events for 
two sessions for family-controlled firms only. From Table 4.6, we also find the 
probability of information events, α, to be lower in the morning session for both types of 
firms. Since the market maker increases the α for the afternoon session, we can strongly 
infer that αM is significantly lower than αA for family-controlled firms. This fact may 
cause the market marker to form significantly lower PINM of the family-controlled firms 
in the morning session. 
In short, the statistical analyses imply a significantly lower αM, probability of 
information events in the morning session, for family-controlled firms only. This causes 
the PIN of family-controlled firms in the morning session to be very low. We also claim 
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that this fact may in turn cause the PINM to be lower than the PINA for family-controlled 
firms. 
4.3.3 PIN of Easley et al (1996b) Versus Modified PIN 
We have used both ways of PIN calculation in previous sections of this chapter. Do 
different PIN calculation methods really matter in empirical research? Since we do not 
expect to get boundary values of α for most of the stocks, we expect different numerical 
values for different PIN calculation methods. More specifically, we expect the modified 
PIN to be lower than the PIN developed by Easley et al (1996b). 
Table 4.10: Test of Equality of Different PIN Calculations 
 
Hypothesis Testing PIN of Easley et al (1996b) – Modified PIN = 0 
 t statistic Wilcoxon Z 
Morning Session      16.445*** -7.374*** 
Afternoon Session      15.174*** -7.374*** 
*** represents significance at 1% level. t statistics are based on the difference of matched 
pairs and since this assumes population distribution of the sample differences to be 
normal, we use the Wilcoxon non-parametric test. This test is based on the ranking of 
non-zero differences of two matched samples. We exclude one firm for which we find no 
difference between PIN of Easley et al (1996b) and modified PIN. 
 
Table 4.10 compares the difference between the two methods of PIN calculation. 
We find that the PIN of Easley et al (1996b) is significantly lower than the modified one. 
Both test statistics provide enough evidence to reject the null at the 1% significance level 
(note that we find boundary values of α for one out of all family-controlled and widely-
held firms). We confirm Hypothesis 6 that the modified PIN is less than the PIN 
developed by Easley et al (1996b). Since PIN has many empirical implications, e.g. its 
inclusion to the Fama-French three factor model in Easley et al (2002), we urge further 
research with our proposed formulation of PIN. 
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4.4 Three periods per day 
In the previous section, we have presented strong evidence in favour of different rates of 
uninformed and informed traders across morning and afternoon sessions. Lee and Ready 
(1991) report a higher level of trading frequency before 11:00 am and after 2:30 pm. We 
also observe similar trends in trading frequency for most of our sample firms, (see 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are consistent with previous literature that trading frequencies 
of stocks follow a U-shaped curve. From the graphs, we find that trading patterns are 
higher during the first and last hours. This suggests that trader arrival rates, ε and µ, 
should be different during the beginning and end of the day compared to the middle. 
Figure 4.1: Frequency of Trading of BGO Stocks during Operational Hours 
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This graph depicts the trading pattern of Bema Gold Corporation 
(BGO), the most frequently traded widely-held company of our 
sample. 
 
Therefore we separate each trading day into three event periods and analyze 
whether 1) the probabilities of information events (α) of different sessions are similar and 
2) the PINFC is higher than the PINWH across different sessions. 
 58
Figure 4.2: Frequency of Trading of GG Stocks during Operational Hours 
_FREQ_
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
TI ME
5: 33: 20 8: 20: 00 11: 06: 40 13: 53: 20 16: 40: 00 19: 26: 40 22: 13: 20
 
This graph depicts the trading pattern of Goldcorp Inc. (GC), the 
most frequently traded family-controlled company of our sample. 
 
4.4.1 General Findings 
Considering the study of Lee and Ready (1991), we segregate trading days into three 
periods – before 11:00 am, from 11:00 to 2:30 pm and after 2:30 pm. For convenience, 
we term these periods as first (F), second (S) and third (T) session respectively. In this 
section, we use the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test to analyze whether the probabilities of α 
are similar across different sessions for every individual firms of our sample. We present 
the results of family-controlled firms first in Table 4.11.  
For 59% of family-controlled firms, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
probabilities of information events across first and second sessions are similar. This goes 
up to 76% when we consider second and third sessions in the null hypothesis. Our results 
present strong evidence in favour of similar probability of information events across 
different sessions within trading days for most family-controlled firms. Since similar 
probability of information events is expected if information events occur more than once 
in a day, we find strong evidence in favour of Hypothesis 3. Based on these findings, we  
 59
Table 4.11: Test of Similar α across Three Periods for Individual Family-Controlled 
Firms 
 
Family-Controlled Firms 
Null Hypotheses Firm 
Symbols αF = αS αS = αT αF = αT αF = αS = αT
ABY   **  
AGT *** *  ** 
BVF     
BPO     
CFK     
GIB   ** * 
FLI *** *** *** *** 
CBJ     
CWG     
CLS *** * * *** 
CEF ***  *** *** 
CJR   ** * 
DTC  * ** * 
FFH ***   *** 
FS *  ** * 
GG     
HBG **  * * 
LGF ***  *** *** 
MIM  *** *** *** 
MGA     
MNG  **  * 
PAL   *  
OPY ***  *** *** 
PPK     
IQW   *  
RIC *** *** ***  
RG **   * 
SJR **  ** ** 
TOC     
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Subscripts F, S and T 
refers to the first, second and third sessions of a trading day. We use the LR test 
statistic to test whether the restrictions are in fact true. For large LR test statistics, we 
reject the null hypotheses. We reject αF = αS for 41% of firms, αS = αT for 24% of 
firms and the joint hypothesis for 55% of firms at 10% significance level. Every firm 
has 1,500 trading periods for the maximum likelihood estimation. 
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conclude that the market maker perceives different trading frequencies to imply different 
trading periods for most of the family-controlled stocks. Are the results specific to 
family-controlled firms? 
The findings of widely-held firms in Table 4.12 are consistent with those for 
family-controlled firms. For 52% of widely-held firms, we find similar α across first and 
second sessions whereas we find similar α for 68% of widely-held across second and 
third session. Again, we do not expect similar probability of information events for 
sessions that start considerably after the beginning of the trading day. These findings 
therefore confirm our suspicion about findings considering one period per day. In 
addition, there may be a need to reconcile how many periods per day should be 
considered for empirical analysis. However, before making any conclusion on that issue, 
we compare the PINs of different samples. 
4.4.2 Family-Controlled Firms versus Widely-Held Firms 
We test whether the PIN of family-controlled firms is higher than the PIN of widely-held 
firms across first, second and third sessions. 
From Table 4.13, we find all PINs of family-controlled firms to be higher than 
those of widely-held firms except the average modified PIN in the first session. However, 
the market maker does not observe a significantly higher PIN for family-controlled then 
Table 4.12: Test of Similar α across Three Periods for Individual Widely-Held 
Firms 
 
Widely-Held Firms 
Null Hypotheses Firm 
Symbols αF = αS αS = αT αF = αT αF = αS = αT
AZK *** *** ***  
BMO     
BNS     
BGO   ** * 
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BEL *** ** *** *** 
CGT  *** *** *** 
HCH ***  *** *** 
CCJ  **  * 
CNQ     
CM ***  *** *** 
CNI  *   
CP **  ** ** 
KRY ***   ** 
EGO     
ENB     
ERF *** *** *** *** 
EENC  * ** * 
FHR **   * 
GRS ***  *** *** 
GSS ** ** * * 
GBN     
IAG ***  *** *** 
IMO  ** ** ** 
N *    
IDR     
IPS     
KFS ***  ** *** 
MFC ** **  ** 
MRB     
NCX     
NXG     
PMU  * *** *** 
PTF *** * *** *** 
PDG     
PVX ***  *** *** 
RY   ** * 
SLF **    
SU **  *  
TU  **  * 
TLM     
TAC *** *** *** *** 
TRP     
TGA *  *** *** 
ZL *    
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Subscripts F, S and 
T refers to first, second and third sessions of trading days. We use the LR test 
statistic to test whether the restrictions are in fact true. For large LR test statistics, 
we reject the null hypotheses. We reject αF = αS for 48% of firms, αS = αT for 32% 
of firms and the joint hypothesis for 55% of firms at 10% significance level. 
Every firm has 1,500 trading periods for the maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Table 4.13: Test of Equality of PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms 
(Three Periods)  
 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b) Modified PIN 
Statistics 1st session 2
nd 
session 3
rd session 1st session 2
nd 
session 3
rd session
Family-Controlled 
     
Mean 0.192 0.192 0.199 0.102 0.110 0.109 
Std. dev. 0.109 0.091 0.110 0.036 0.030 0.031 
Size 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Widely-Held      
Mean 0.178 0.173 0.176 0.106 0.108 0.107 
Std. dev. 0.089 0.074 0.081 0.40 0.030 0.035 
Size 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Hypothesis testing: PINFC = PINWH
Z statistic 0.656 0.920 0.950 -0.547 0.296 0.355 
Mann-
Whitney Z 0.417 -0.124 -0.034 0.868 -0.068 -0.349 
We test the null hypothesis that PIN of family-controlled firm is equal to PIN of widely-
held for every session. No test statistic is found significant at 5% level. 
 
that for widely-held firms for any session. Both the Z statistics (based on different sample 
sizes) and the Mann-Whitney Z statistics are low enough to present consistent results. 
Based on this evidence, we reject Hypothesis 2 that the PINFC is higher than the PINWH.  
Though the findings of the present and previous sections are not as expected, they 
are at least consistent. Separating the trading days into two and three sessions becomes 
the crucial factor in determining whether average PINFC is higher or lower (not 
statistically) than PINWH. However, it is clear that the assumptions of 1) constant arrival 
rates of informed and uninformed traders throughout the day and 2) information event 
occurrence only at the beginning of the day are not valid in empirical analysis. 
As in the previous section, we investigate whether PINs of individual samples and 
whole sample are similar across different sessions in Table 4.14. In this analysis, we have 
first, second and third sessions for every type of sample firms. We use the Kruskal-Wallis 
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one-way analysis of variance to test whether the three distributions, i.e. distributions for 
the first, second and third sessions, of PINs of any sample group is identical. 
Table 4.14: Test of Equality of PINs across Three Periods 
 
Hypothesis testing: PINF = PINS = PINT
Statistic PIN: Easley et al (1996b) Modified PIN 
All firms   
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic 0.208 2.293 
Widely-held firms   
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic 0.084 0.422 
Family-controlled firms   
Kruskal-Wallis W 0.200 2.691 
No test statistic is significant at 5% level. The Kruskal-Wallis test statistic follows χ2 
distribution with K – 1 degrees of freedom where K is the number of different samples. 
Here, we have three samples: first session (F), second session (S) and third session (T). 
 
For lower values of the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that distributions of PINs are the same across the three sessions for any of the 
individual samples, e.g. family-controlled firms. Of either sample group, the market 
maker does not form significantly different PINs for any session. We also test whether 
distributions of alpha during different sessions are similar. 
We find from Table 4.15 that the market maker forms higher probabilities of 
information events for sessions that start later in the trading day. This finding is very 
similar to that of two-period analysis. However, differences among the probability 
distributions of information events are not found to be significant in Table 4.16. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistics are very low and therefore we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that distributions of alpha during different sessions are similar for any of our 
individual samples. Since the market maker perceives similar probability distributions on 
information events at the beginning of the first, second and third sessions, we do not the  
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Table 4.15: Descriptive Statistics of α (Three Periods) 
 
 Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms 
Statistics First Second Third First Second Third 
Average 0.201 0.233 0.228 0.228 0.249 0.239 
Standard Deviation 0.063 0.071 0.067 0.070 0.082 0.089 
 
Table 4.16: Test of Equality of α across Three Periods 
 
Hypothesis testing: αF = αS = αT
 Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms Total firms 
Kruskal-Wallis W 3.645 1.321 4.043 
W is the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. No test statistic is significant at 5% level. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic follows χ2 distribution with K – 1 degrees of freedom where 
K is the number of different samples. Here, we have three samples: first session (F), 
second session (S) and third session (T). 
 
reject Hypothesis 3. This finding along with the higher α in the second session provides 
strong evidence in favour of multiple periods within trading days. Our findings of Table 
4.16 are consistent with those of Table 4.11 and 4.12. Based on the findings of Table 4.11 
and 4.12, we could not reject the hypothesis of similar α across different sessions for 
most of the firms. Table 4.16 considers testing the same hypothesis for firms of specific 
samples, e.g. family-controlled. In both cases, we do not reject Hypothesis 3. Note that 
unlike in the two-periods-per-day analysis, we do not find significantly higher PIN or α 
for family-controlled firms in any session. 
In a nutshell, our analysis considering three periods per day casts doubts on the 
findings of the one-period-per-day analysis. We conclude that the assumptions to 
estimate the parameters useful in calculating PIN are very strong. The Poisson arrival 
rates are not constant throughout the day. Therefore, to get precise estimates from the 
likelihood function, we should consider multiple periods within trading days. 
 65
We also find that PINFC is not significantly higher than PINWH. A competitive 
market maker would not have to maintain high spreads for stocks with relatively high 
numbers of noise traders and low numbers of informed traders since he is able to recoup 
losses from uninformed, noise traders with even a narrow spread. Furthermore, all of the 
corporate finance studies discussed in the literature review section consider abnormal 
profits by insiders. In this study, we analyze the adverse selection cost form the market 
maker’s point of view. Since the market maker maintains the spread only to recoup his 
losses, our findings may not be entirely inconsistent with the existing literature. 
4.4.3 Stability of Estimates 
In the previous sub-sections we have estimated PINs based on one, two or three periods 
per day. An important issue is to investigate whether the estimated parameters are stable  
Table 4.17: Stability of alpha and delta 
Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms  
Alpha Delta Alpha Delta 
One period/day 0.249 
(0.075) 
0.333 
(0.189) 
0.278 
(0.084) 
0.293 
(0.176) 
Two periods/day     
0.299 
(0.219) 
0.386 
(0.222) 
0.264 
(0.131) 
0.340 
(0.192) 
Morning session 
 
Afternoon session 
 
0.317 
(0.215) 
0.375 
(0.219) 
0.279 
(0.141) 
0.312 
(0.192) 
Three periods/day     
0.201 
(0.063) 
0.381 
(0.190) 
0.228 
(0.069) 
0.366 
(0.179) 
0.233 
(0.072) 
0.377 
(0.188) 
0.249 
(0.082) 
0.317 
(0.173) 
First session 
 
Second session 
 
Third session 0.228 
(0.067) 
0.363 
(0.169) 
0.239 
(0.089) 
0.321 
(0.195) 
 
in those analyses. We focus only on alpha (the probability of information event) and delta 
(the probability of bad news) since mu and epsilon (trade arrival rates of informed and 
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uninformed traders respectively) are likely to differ.28 The findings of this analysis are 
presented in Table 4.17. As we segregate trading days into different trading sessions, we 
get different numerical values of alpha and delta. We find that the parameter estimates of 
delta seem to fluctuate less than those of alpha. The stability of the parameter estimates in 
the two- and three-periods per day analyses strengths our investigation of multiple 
periods per trading day. However, a more formal analysis is warranted to verify how 
many sessions/trading day shall be considered in future studies. 
4.5 Analyzing Firms with Change in Ownership Status 
The findings of the previous sections empirically show how the market maker estimates 
the probability of informed trading for family-controlled and widely-held firms. In the 
three-periods-per-day analysis, we find that the average PINFC is higher (but not 
significantly) than the average PINWH, whereas in the two-periods-per-day analysis, we 
find the average PINFC to be (insignificantly) lower than the average PINWH. We also find 
that the market maker observes significantly lower probability of information events and 
therefore significantly lower PIN of family-controlled firms in the morning session. 
However, we did not find such results in the three-periods-per-day analysis. 
 In this section, we perform an event study about the event that a firm’s ownership 
structure changes to analyze whether we are able to reach similar conclusions. We 
consider two periods per trading day to analyze this issue. To estimate the parameters 
accurately, we consider an event window of 30 days around the event day. We find 9 
firms listed with NYSE or AMEX to have data in 2004-05 for at least 60 days both prior 
to and after the event window. For firms that change ownership status more than once, 
                                                 
28 We have documented this in Table 4.4 and 4.5. We also present different epsilon and mu per period in 
Appendix 3. Results are similar in both cases. 
 67
we consider the first event only in our study as some firms re-change their ownership 
status very quickly. 
4.5.1 General Findings 
Before comparing the PINs of family-controlled and widely-held firms around the event 
period, we analyze how α, µ and ε change after such an event in Table 4.18. In particular, 
we compare whether estimates of these parameters change after altering the ownership 
structure. We present an example for clear understanding. We define Agnico-Eagle 
Mines Ltd. (AEM) as a family-controlled firm initially. However, it becomes widely-held 
on August 31, 2004.  Since we consider an event window of 30 days, we perform our 
analysis on 60 trading days before August 16, 2004 and after June 14, 2004. In this case, 
we consider Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. family-controlled for 60 trading days before 
August 16, 2004 and widely-held for 60 trading days after June 14, 2004. Restrictions on 
parameters are tested individually and jointly in the likelihood estimation function. This 
enables us to directly perform the likelihood ratio test. For large values of LR test 
statistics, we reject the hypothesis (restriction). Rejecting hypotheses, or, in other words, 
finding significant changes in the rate of informed and uninformed traders and in the 
probability of information event of a firm suggest that the firm is signalling information 
to the market by altering its ownership status. How does the market maker react to such 
signals? 
 To the market maker, trading patterns of uninformed and informed traders 
significantly change for most of the firms. Change in the ownership structure certainly 
signals information to the market participants. Regardless of whether a firm changes its  
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Table 4.18: Test of Equality of Parameters across Two Periods (Event Study) 
 
Firm 
Symbols 
 
 
αBefore= 
αAfter (M) 
 
(1) 
 
 
αBefore= 
αAfter (A) 
 
(2) 
αBefore= αAfter 
(M), 
αBefore= αAfter 
(A) 
 
(1, 2) 
 
 
εBefore = 
εAfter (M) 
 
(3) 
 
 
εBefore = 
εAfter (A)
 
(4) 
εBefore = εAfter 
(M),  
εBefore = εAfter 
(A) 
 
(3, 4) 
 
 
µBefore = 
µAfter (M) 
 
(5) 
 
 
µBefore = 
µAfter (A) 
 
(6) 
µBefore = µAfter 
(M);   
µBefore = µAfter 
(A) 
 
(5, 6) 
 
 
 
 
(1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6) 
AEM    *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
SNG    *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
COT  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
GIL  *  *** *** *** **  ** *** 
GLG *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** 
MDG ***  ** *** *** *** ***  *** *** 
MFN    *** *** ***  *** *** *** 
POT ***  ***  *** *** * *** *** *** 
VGZ    *** *** ***    *** 
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M and A refer to morning and afternoon sessions. We reject (1) for 33.33% of firms at 1%, (2) for 33.33% at 10%, (3) for 88.89% of 
firms at 1%, (4) for all firms at 1%, (5) for 77.78% of firms at 1% and (6) for 66.66% of firms at 1% significance level. We reject the 
joint hypothesis (last column) for all firms at 1% significance level. It should be mentioned that every estimate with subscript Before and 
After are estimated with 60 trading days.  
 
status from family-controlled to widely-held or vice versa, the average rates of both 
uninformed and informed trading increase after the event window (see the last row of 
Table A7.1 of Appendix 7). However, the market maker does not alter his probability of 
information event for most of the firms after such an event. We report Table 4.19 below 
to present information on the exact event date and how firms have changed their 
respective ownership. 
Table 4.19: Firms with a Change in the Ownership Status 
 
Firm Symbols Exchange Type of Change Event Date 
AEM NYSE Family-controlled to widely-held August 31, 2004 
SNG AMEX Widely-held to family-controlled July 21, 2005 
COT NYSE Family-controlled to widely-held May 19, 2004 
GIL NYSE Family-controlled to widely-held June 30, 2005 
GLG NYSE Widely-held to family-controlled January 31, 2005 
MDG NYSE Family-controlled to widely-held April 30, 2004 
MFN AMEX Family-controlled to widely-held April 30, 2004 
POT NYSE Widely-held to family-controlled November 30, 2004 
VGZ AMEX Family-controlled to widely-held December 31, 2004 
To identify the exact event date, we rely on the “Date of Event Which Requires Filing 
this Statement” section of 13D and 13G filings. 
 
As stated earlier, we construct the family-controlled sample by considering 
family-controlled firms before and after the events. For example, we consider AEM 
before the event and SNG after the event in our family-controlled sample. We form the 
sample of widely-held firms in the same way. This enables us to compare the PINFC and 
PINWH around the reported event period. 
4.5.2 Family-Controlled Firms Versus Widely-Held Firms 
We find from the previous section that arrival rates of both informed and uninformed 
traders increase after a change in the ownership status. To see how the market maker 
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revises the probability of informed trading, we compare the PIN of family-controlled to 
that of widely-held firms in Table 4.20. 
Table 4.20: Testing Equality of PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms 
around the Event Period 
 
Morning Session Afternoon Session 
Statistics Family-
Controlled Widely-Held
Family-
Controlled Widely-Held
PIN: Easley et al (1996b)     
Mean 0.145 0.132 0.128 0.151 
Standard Deviation 0.055 0.048 0.041 0.042 
Modified PIN     
Mean 0.106 0.093 0.089 0.114 
Standard Deviation 0.039 0.031 0.030 0.027 
Hypothesis Testing: PINFC = PINWH
 Morning Session Afternoon Session 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b)   
Wilcoxon T 16 8* 
Modified PIN   
Wilcoxon T 16 4** 
** and * represent significance at 5% and 10% respectively. The Wilcoxon T of 4 with 
sample size of 9 is significant at or above 2% level. Since sample size is less than 20, we 
use the Wilcoxon T instead of Z, the normal approximation. 
 
For both calculations of PIN, the average PINFC is higher than the average PINWH 
in the morning session. However in the afternoon session, the average PINFC is lower 
than the average PINWH. It should be mentioned in this connection that we found the 
average PINFC to be lower than the average PINWH in both morning and afternoon 
sessions in the two-periods-per-day analysis. Though the hypothesis of equal PINs cannot 
be rejected for the morning session, there is enough evidence to reject it for the afternoon 
session. Therefore, PINFC is found to be significantly lower than PINWH in the afternoon 
session in this event study. This contrasts with our earlier two-periods-per-day finding 
that PIN of family-controlled is significantly lower than that of widely-held firms in the 
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morning session. However, we still find PINWH to be higher, contrary to our Hypothesis 
2. As earlier, we analyze the estimated parameters useful in the PIN calculation to see 
what is driving the PINFC in the afternoon session to be very low. 
Table 4.21: Test of Equality of Parameters of Sample Firms around the Event 
Period 
 
Statistics Morning Session Afternoon Session 
 Family-
Controlled 
Widely-Held Family-
Controlled 
Widely-Held 
Alpha (α)     
Mean 0.307 0.257 0.266 0.341 
Standard Deviation 0.113 0.107 0.145 0.085 
Epsilon (ε)     
Mean 154.468 172.251 136.472 130.705 
Standard Deviation 119.696 127.482 98.687 92.648 
Mu (µ)     
Mean 146.339 169.544 157.363 112.108 
Standard Deviation 84.924 87.238 105.983 58.961 
 Wilcoxon T 
Null Hypotheses Morning Session Afternoon Session 
αFC = αWH 14 9* 
εFC = εWH 18 18 
µFC = µWH 17 10 
* represent significance at 10% level. Since sample size is less than 20, we use the 
Wilcoxon T instead of Z, the normal approximation. 
 
We test in Table 4.21 whether the estimates, which are useful in PIN calculation, 
of family-controlled firms are similar to those of widely-held firms. For high values of 
the Wilconxon T, we cannot reject all hypotheses except αFC = αWH for the afternoon 
session. Since αFC < αWH in the afternoon session, we conclude that the market maker 
infers a significantly lower probability of information events for family-controlled firms 
in that session. This may cause him to perceive significantly lower PINFC in the afternoon 
session. Since PIN of family-controlled firms is found to be significantly lower than that 
of widely-held firms, we reject Hypothesis 2 (that the PIN of family-controlled firms is 
higher than that of widely-held firms for the afternoon session). 
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4.6 Robustness Check 
4.6.1 Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
All of the results presented in previous sections consider unconstrained likelihood 
functions with Table 4.4, 4.5, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.18 as exceptions. If the findings of two- 
and three- periods-per-day are strong, we may expect to get similar results even with the 
constrained likelihood functions. 
Since we are forcing all parameters – α, δ, µ and ε – in the afternoon to be equal 
to those of the morning in the two-period-per-analysis, our PIN estimates of the afternoon 
are expected to be equal to those of the morning. Therefore, we analyze PINs of family-
controlled and widely-held firms for the morning session only in Table 4.22 in the 
previous page. 
Like the unconstrained two-periods-per-day analysis, the constrained analysis in 
Table 4.22 shows that the average PINFC is lower than the average PINWH. High Z and 
Mann-Whitney test statistics confirm that the average PINFC is significantly lower than 
the average PINWH at 5% significance level. Based on this analysis, we reject Hypothesis 
2. 
In the three-period constrained likelihood function we are forcing the probability 
of information events occurring to be equal across three sessions only. As a result, PINs 
of three sessions are not likely to be the same since other parameters are not forced to be 
equal. We present the constrained analysis of three event periods per day in Table 4.23. 
For the PIN calculation of Easley et al (1996b), we find the average PINFC to be 
higher than the average PINWH, a finding similar to that of unconstrained analysis. 
However for the modified PIN formulation, the average PINFC is slightly lower than the 
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Table 4.22: Test of Equality of PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms 
(Constrained) 
 
Statistics Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b)   
Mean 0.128 0.151 
Standard deviation 0.052 0.045 
Sample size 29 44 
Modified PIN   
Mean 0.084 0.099 
Standard deviation 0.032 0.029 
Sample size 29 44 
Hypothesis testing PINFC = PINWH
 Z test Mann-Whitney Z 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b) 1.922** 2.040** 
Modified PIN 1.918** 1.916** 
** and *** represent significance levels at 5% and 1% respectively. Since the 
population distributions of parameters are unknown, we perform the Mann-Whitney 
non-parametric test. 
 
Table 4.23: Test of Equality of PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms 
across Three Periods (Constrained) 
 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b) Modified PIN 
Statistics 
1st session 2
nd 
session 3
rd session 1st session 2
nd 
session 3
rd session
Family-Controlled 
     
Mean 0.204 0.187 0.194 0.110 0.104 0.106 
Std. dev. 0.106 0.096 0.104 0.029 0.026 0.027 
Size 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Widely-Held      
Mean 0.183 0.169 0.178 0.111 0.105 0.108 
Std. dev. 0.089 0.084 0.088 0.038 0.035 0.036 
Size 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Hypothesis testing: PINFC = PINWH
Z statistic 0.877 0.804 0.660 -0.180 -0.066 -0.340 
Mann-
Whitney Z -0.180 0.169 0.237 0.203 -0.124 0.349 
We test the null hypothesis that PIN of family-controlled firm is equal to PIN of widely-
held for every session. No test statistic is found significant at 5% level. 
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average PINWH. However, none of the test statistics are significant even at the 5% level. 
Considering three periods per day and assuming similar level of information events at the 
beginning of every period, we find that the market maker does not form significantly 
different PINs for family-controlled and widely-held firms. This confirms our findings on 
the three-period-per-day analysis of the previous section. 
4.6.2 PIN of NASDAQ Firms 
As mentioned before, we excluded 38 firms listed with NASDAQ only from the NYSE/ 
AMEX analysis for the apparent difference in the organized and OTC market setup. For 
the obvious importance, we perform a detailed study on these 38 NASDAQ listed firms 
in this section. 25 of 38 firms have data for the entire sample period. Of these 25 firms, 
14 are identified as family-controlled firms whereas 11 are identified as widely-held 
firms. To define the ultimate ownership of a firm, we follow the same procedure as 
described in the Sample Construction, Section 3. We begin the investigation with the 
general findings of two- and three- periods per day analyses of NASDAQ-listed firms. In 
Table 4.24, we analyze whether the different restrictions on parameters, e.g. similar 
probability of information events, similar arrival rates of informed trading across 
different sessions etc., hold. 
We find from Table 4.24 that in the two periods per day analysis, arrival rates of 
both informed and uninformed traders are different for over 90% of family-controlled and 
widely-held firms listed with NASDAQ. This finding shows that the Poisson arrival rates 
of informed and uninformed traders are not constant throughout the day. In addition, 71% 
and 73% of family-controlled and widely-held firms, respectively, do not have 
statistically different probability of information events. This supports the idea of 
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considering multiple periods per day to estimate parameters from the likelihood 
estimation. The joint hypothesis of all restrictions is rejected for 96% of family-
controlled and 100% of widely-held firms. These findings are very similar to those found 
in the two-period analysis of NYSE/AMEX listed firms and cast serious doubts on any 
empirical findings considering an entire day as an event period. 
Is the three-period analysis of NASDAQ listed firms similar to that of NYSE/ 
AMEX listed firms? As earlier, we particularly investigate in Table 4.25 whether the 
probability of information events across two adjacent event periods are equal. We cannot 
reject αF = αS and αS = αT for 50% and 64% of family-controlled firms listed with NASD 
AQ respectively. Earlier in the NYSE/AMEX listed firms, we could not reject these 
restrictions for 59% and 76% of family-controlled firm respectively. The same 
restrictions, which were not rejected for 52% and 68% of NYSE/AMEX listed widely-
held firms respectively, are now not rejected for 82% of widely-held firms listed with 
NASDAQ. Similar probability of information events across different sessions once again 
supports multiple event periods per trading day (Hypothesis 3). 
The general findings of firms listed with NASDAQ are found to be similar to 
those of firms listed with NYSE/AMEX. Despite many differences in the organized and 
OTC market setup, we find arrival rates of both informed and uninformed traders to be 
different for different sessions for NASDAQ listed firms. In addition, similar probability 
of information events across adjacent sessions provides strong evidence to consider 
multiple event periods per day for the maximum likelihood estimation. These similar 
findings suggest we investigate whether PINFC is higher than PINWH. As usual, we 
perform the two-periods-per-day analysis at first. 
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Table 4.24: Test of Similar Parameters across Two Periods for Individual Family-
Controlled and Widely-Held Firms (NASDAQ listed) 
 
Null Hypotheses Firm 
Symbol αM = αA δM = δA
αM = αA, 
δM = δA
εM = εA μM = μA
αM = αA, δM = δA, 
εM = εA, εM = εA
Family-Controlled Firms 
BLD    *** *** *** 
CSL     *  
EXF ***  ** ***  *** 
FSR    *** * *** 
HYG *   *** *** *** 
IMA ***  ** *** *** *** 
IVA   *** *** *** *** 
JCT    ***  *** 
MER    *** *** *** 
NRM  *  *** *** *** 
RIM  *  *** *** *** 
STK    *** *** *** 
TES **  * *** *** *** 
ZIC    *** *** *** 
Widely-Held Firms 
BIO    *** *** *** 
CSP    *** *** *** 
DRA    *** *** *** 
FMT  ***  *** *** *** 
HUM *** *** *** *** *** *** 
MEO *** ** ** *** *** *** 
PAA    *** *** *** 
SSP   *** *** *** *** 
TLC *    *** *** 
VSG    *** ** *** 
WED    *** *** *** 
*, ** and *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Subscripts M and A represent periods before and after 1:00 pm of trading days. We use the 
LR test statistic to test whether the restrictions are in fact true. For large LR test statistics, 
we reject the null hypotheses. We reject αM = αA for 29% and 27% of family-controlled 
and widely-held firms at 10%, δM = δA for 14% and 27% of family-controlled and 
widely-held firms at 10%, εM = εA for 93% and 91% of family-controlled and widely-held 
firms at 10% and μM = μA for 86% and 100% of family-controlled and widely-held firms 
at 10%. We also reject the joint hypothesis of all restrictions for 96% and 100% of 
family-controlled and widely-held firms at 1% level. Every firm has 1,000 trading 
periods for the maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Table 4.25: Test of Similar α across Three Periods for Individual Family-Controlled 
Firms 
 
Null Hypotheses Firm 
Symbols αF = αS αS = αT αF = αT αF = αS, αS = αT
Family-Controlled Firms 
BLD *** ***  *** 
CSL     
EXF **  *** *** 
FSR ***  *** *** 
HYG     
IMA *** ***  *** 
IVA   *  
JCT ** ***  *** 
MER ** ***  ** 
NRM     
RIM     
STK *** *  *** 
TES     
ZIC     
Widely-Held Firms 
BIO     
CSP  *** ** *** 
DRA ***  *** *** 
FMT     
HUM ***  *** *** 
MEO     
PAA     
SSP     
TLC     
VSG  *  *** 
WED     
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Subscripts F, S and T refers 
to the first, second and third sessions of a trading day. We use the LR test statistic to test 
whether the restrictions are in fact true. For large LR test statistics, we reject the null 
hypotheses. We reject αF = αS for 50% and 18% of family-controlled and widely-held 
firms, αS = αT for 36% and 18% of family-controlled and widely-held firms and the joint 
hypothesis for 50% and 36% of family-controlled and widely-held firms at 10% 
significance level. Every firm has 1,500 trading periods for the maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
 
Two main findings of the descriptive statistics of Table 4.26 are as follows: First, 
family-controlled firms listed with NASDAQ have a higher average PIN than widely- 
held firms. Note that earlier we found for NYSE/AMEX listed firms that the average  
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Table 4.26: PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms listed with NASDAQ 
(Two Periods) 
 
  
PINM: 
Easley et al 
(1996b) 
Modified 
PINM
PINA: Easley 
et al (1996b) 
Modified 
PINA
Family-Controlled Firms    
Mean 0.171 0.093 0.171 0.095 
Standard Deviation 0.062 0.014 0.059 0.018 
Sample size 14 14 14 14 
 
Widely-Held Firms     
Mean 0.156 0.088 0.156 0.094 
Standard Deviation 0.027 0.008 0.026 0.011 
Sample Size 11 11 11 11 
Hypothesis testing PINFC = PINWH
Mann-Whitney Z -0.493 -1.533 -0.438 0 
We test the null hypothesis that PIN of family-controlled firm is equal to PIN of 
widely-held for every session. No test statistic is found significant at 5% level. 
 
PINFC is lower than the average PINWH. Second, the descriptive statistics of PINM and 
PINA are very similar. The Mann-Whitney Z test is performed to investigate whether this 
similarity is significant. The low values of test statistics mean that we cannot reject the 
equality of PINs of family-controlled and widely-held firms in morning and afternoon 
sessions. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 2 that PINFC is higher than PINWH. 
The two-periods-per-day analysis on NASDAQ listed firms strengthens most of 
our findings of NYSE/AMEX listed firms. This study on NASDAQ listed firms also 
warrants further research to analyze factors that cause the market maker in the 
NYSE/AMEX to form significantly lower PIN for family-controlled firms and multiple 
market makers in the NASDAQ to infer similar PINs for family-controlled and widely-
held firms. 
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We now compare the PIN of family-controlled and widely-held firms listed with 
NASDAQ by considering three periods per trading day in Table 4.27. Like 
NYSE/AMEX listed family-controlled firms, NASDAQ family-controlled firms have  
Table 4.27: PINs of Family-Controlled and Widely-Held Firms listed with NASDAQ 
(Three Periods) 
 
PIN: Easley et al (1996b) Modified PIN 
Statistics 
1st session 2
nd  
session 3
rd session 1st session 2
nd  
session 3
rd session
Family-Controlled 
     
Mean 0.220 0.218 0.220 0.099 0.111 0.106 
Std. dev. 0.133 0.140 0.133 0.029 0.041 0.035 
Size 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Widely-Held      
Mean 0.189 0.174 0.180 0.093 0.098 0.099 
Std. dev. 0.081 0.069 0.071 0.018 0.032 0.033 
Size 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Hypothesis testing: PINFC = PINWH
Mann-
Whitney Z -0.219 -0.493 -0.383 -0.383 -0.712 -0.821 
We test the null hypothesis that PIN of family-controlled firm is equal to PIN of widely-
held for every session. No test statistic is found significant at 5% level. 
 
higher PIN, on an average, than NASDAQ widely-held firms in the three periods per day 
analysis. However, the Mann-Whitney Z statistics are not high enough to reject the 
equality of PINs of family-controlled and widely-held firms. Based on this, we also reject 
Hypothesis 2, i.e. PINFC is higher than PINWH. 
The findings of the three-periods-per-day analysis on NASDAQ listed firms are 
consistent with those on NYSE/AMEX listed firms. Though the average PINFC is higher 
than the average PINWH, they are not significantly higher. 
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4.7 Summary of the Findings 
This chapter entails analysis of PIN by considering different numbers of periods per 
trading day. Based on the two periods per day analysis of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
listed firms, we find strong evidence in favour of different arrival rates of informed and 
uninformed traders. Graphs of trading frequency of frequently traded firms also confirm 
the idea of Lee and Ready (1991) that trading volume is higher in the first and last couple 
of hours of trading. We also find a higher alpha (α) at the beginning of afternoon session 
(1:00 pm) and second session (11:00 am) in the two- and three- period analyses 
respectfully. Since the probability of information events (α) is not expected to rise later 
on in the trading day if information events occur only once at the beginning, both two- 
and three- period analyses of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ listed firms establish strong 
support for the occurrence of multiple information events within trading days. These 
particular findings cast serious doubts on empirical results that consider the entire day as 
an event to estimate PIN from the likelihood function. This is one of the most important 
findings of this study. 
 Both two- and three- periods-per-day analyses provide evidence against 
Hypothesis 2, i.e. PINFC is higher than PINWH. The event study also reports strong 
evidence against the same hypothesis. In addition, we find PINFC to be significantly 
lower than PINWH in the morning session of the two-periods-per-day study and in the 
afternoon session of the event study. We find in both cases that the probability of 
information event (α) is the driving factor of such results. These findings are consistent 
with the existing literature for several reasons. First, the market maker only needs to 
maintain a narrow spread for firms with relatively high uninformed traders and low 
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informed traders.1 Second, the PIN, which is a function of the probability of an 
information event and the rate of informed and uninformed traders, has been used to 
capture the asymmetric information cost in this study. The PIN variable does not include 
order sizes and order book information, both of which are used by market makers in 
making inferences on information contents of incoming orders. Hence, PIN might be a 
poor proxy to capture the inferences made by market makers. Third, one of our 
limitations of this study is that we define a firm to be a family-controlled if anyone of the 
ultimate owners is found to be an individual or member of a family/group. We do not 
analyze whether that firm is controlled by two or more families. The main idea of 
Demsetz (1986), which is empirically supported by Fidrmuc (2006), is that concentrated 
ownership with less diversified portfolio encourages monitoring activities. If a firm is 
controlled by two or more families, the level of information asymmetry, and thereby PIN, 
may be very low as these families will act as monitors of one another, e.g. they may 
implement stringent rules on insider trading. The same situation will result if the 
controlling individual or family is found to be unrelated to the management. Forth, 
controlling shareholders may refrain from trading on inside information. Though 
corporate finance studies report abnormal returns by insiders, it is not clear what 
proportion of insiders actually trade on inside information. 
 We find results of two- and three-periods per day analyses to be inconsistent in 
that PINFC is found to be lower than PINWH in the two-periods-per-day analysis only. 
This warrants further research to reconcile how many periods to consider in the 
likelihood function developed by Easley et al (1996a, 1996b). Since information events 
                                                 
1 It should be mentioned here that we found the ratio of informed traders to the total number of traders 
given an information event very similar (around 38.50%) for family-controlled and widely-held firms. 
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occur after sporadic intervals, its probability (α) is empirically found to maintain strong 
form of inequality (0 < α < 1). As a result, the modified PIN is also found to be lower 
than the PIN developed by Easley et al (1996b). Since the PIN has been used extensively 
in research, we also recommend further research with our proposed formulation of PIN. 
 In conclusion, the findings of this chapter cast serious doubts on prevalent 
methodology and findings using PIN, and suggest further research to reconfirm existing 
results. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we analyze the information asymmetry of two classes of firms, namely 
family-controlled and widely-held firms. Since a controlling person of a family-
controlled firm holds substantial proportion at the cost of having a less diversified 
portfolio, he specializes his portfolio. Therefore, a controlling person/family/group is 
expected to have a higher level of inside information and make substantial abnormal 
profits. Knowing this, the market maker should maintain a higher spread for family-
controlled firms than for firms with no controlling person/family/group. The PIN variable 
developed by Easley et al (1996a, 1996b) has been used to measure the level of 
information asymmetry in this study. We estimate the parameters from the likelihood 
function and use these estimates to calculate PINs of family-controlled and widely-held 
firms. 
 For a sample of Canadian-based publicly traded firms cross-listed with NYSE and 
AMEX, we find evidence in favour of a higher average spread for family-controlled firms 
(Hypothesis 1). However, we find statistically similar PINs for family-controlled and 
widely-held firms by considering one day as an event period and three event periods per 
trading day. However in the two-period analysis, we find significantly lower PINs for 
family-controlled firms for the morning session. We also perform an event study about 
the event that a firm’s ownership structure changes and find statistically lower PINs for 
family-controlled firms for the afternoon session. Since we reach different conclusions on 
Hypothesis 2, which says the PIN of family-controlled firms is higher than that of 
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widely-held firms, by considering different periods per trading day, we recommend 
further research to resolve this issue. Note that PIN is a function of the probability of 
information events and arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders. For the same 
number of informed traders, PIN of firm A may be substantially lower than that of firm B 
for relatively higher number of uninformed traders. In addition, PINFC may be lower than 
PINWH if family-controlled firms have more than one controlling shareholders. 
Furthermore, controlling shareholders may refrain from trading on inside information. 
Though several corporate finance studies find abnormal profits of insiders, it is not clear 
what proportion of the insiders actually trade. Similar percentages of informed traders of 
family-controlled and widely-held firms reported in the two-period analysis also support 
this idea. Another limitation of using the PIN variable is that it does not include order 
sizes and order book information, both of which are utilized by market makers in making 
inferences on information contents of incoming orders. From this perspective, the PIN 
variable may be a poor proxy for inferences made by market makers. Since we use the 
PIN variable in this study to measure information asymmetry, our results share similar 
limitations. 
By considering several periods within a trading day, we test whether the 
assumptions that 1) information events may occur only at the beginning of the day and 2) 
constant arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders in the Poisson process hold. 
The two-period analysis strongly supports Hypotheses 4 and 5 that arrival rates of both 
uninformed and informed traders change over time within a trading day. Graphs of 
frequently traded stocks confirm this idea. In addition, our finding on similar probability 
of information events within trading days provides evidence in favour of more than one 
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information event per day (Hypothesis 3). Based on these findings, we have doubts about 
any empirical PIN analysis that considers the entire day as an event period. We 
recommend research to re-evaluate the existing findings. 
We also attempt to develop a different formulation of PIN based on the 
probability that the next arriving trader is informed. Based on our empirical findings, we 
fail to reject Hypothesis 6 that the modified PIN is less than the PIN defined by Easley et 
al (1996b). We also recommend further research with our formulation of PIN since this 
variable has been used extensively in finance literatures. 
5.2 Limitations 
This study has several limitations based on which future research can be performed. First, 
we consider family-controlled and widely-held firms cross-listed with NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ only in this study. It is also important to analyze how the market maker 
perceives family-controlled and widely-held firms before cross listing with the U.S. 
exchanges. 
 Second, the sampling criterion of family-controlled firms has several limitations. 
We classify a firm as family-controlled if we were able to identify any individual or 
family members as a group to have controlling voting rights. However, it is possible that 
a single firm is controlled by many individuals or families. In addition, we do not attempt 
to see whether controlling members are related to the management. Fidrmuc et al (2006) 
and Demsetz (1986) note that corporations and families better perform the monitoring 
activity and therefore, if any of these cases turns out to be true for some of the family-
controlled firms, then we expect a lower level of information asymmetry, and therefore 
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PIN, for the whole family-controlled sample. A further study to resolve this problem is 
definitely warranted. 
 Third, Easley et al (1996b) report information asymmetry across stocks with 
different trading frequency. Easley et al (2002) and Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) report 
higher level of information asymmetry for smaller firms. Therefore, a further study by 
considering different levels of trading frequency and firm size to sub-categorize our 
samples may also be conducted. 
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Appendix 1  
Table A1.1: Summary Statistics of Buys and Sells with Informed and Uninformed 
Trading 
 
Family-controlled Firms 
 Buys Sells 
 Min Max Avg Std Min Max Avg Std 
epsilon mu 
ABY 38 760 210.808 110.171 21 850 176.704 87.292 177.344 195.849 
AGT 5 356 58.624 47.329 4 364 54.224 41.266 53.774 90.566 
BVF 194 6137 779.478 558.286 220 5269 718.592 514.628 618.083 531.478 
BPO 3 787 228.298 103.559 20 531 154.268 79.937 169.935 167.407 
CFK 0 450 55.440 80.136 0 352 49.288 65.964 60.038 166.881 
GIB 3 370 37.006 31.375 4 240 35.438 24.265 35.119 57.517 
FLI 1 109 20.758 15.728 1 181 21.284 17.504 19.955 37.657 
CBJ 25 691 229.448 119.376 42 1344 231.664 133.600 213.292 233.366 
CWG 0 98 3.508 6.545 0 22 3.278 3.713 2.071 12.184 
CLS 234 3492 795.286 330.459 242 2985 660.686 276.539 649.101 401.225 
CEF 42 750 152.830 84.821 15 676 107.418 67.940 116.854 166.103 
CJR 0 41 4.616 5.791 0 37 4.494 4.756 3.125 10.140 
DTC 22 755 126.144 79.168 11 503 97.570 63.098 103.053 126.903 
FFH 9 1071 98.972 97.901 3 814 79.080 73.695 83.808 157.192 
FS 40 2028 391.482 246.600 37 1633 296.978 189.446 306.330 351.654 
GG 416 5462 1365.454 781.038 402 3809 1178.618 619.443 1000.865 745.152 
HBG 3 429 48.144 36.495 1 246 39.994 28.734 39.837 59.615 
LGF 55 3792 408.092 322.382 34 1774 325.556 235.487 316.120 352.276 
MIM 8 884 113.592 87.240 14 786 111.384 76.141 104.681 129.957 
MGA 115 1524 441.400 200.879 99 1166 359.072 167.995 358.435 301.918 
MNG 15 1444 141.508 132.984 19 769 140.612 104.309 129.918 200.478 
PAL 39 1064 250.744 171.012 33 1300 223.614 147.938 209.121 292.381 
OPY 0 42 5.728 6.859 0 99 9.134 9.324 6.995 20.969 
PPK 0 29 2.024 3.610 0 23 2.058 3.132 1.943 8.913 
IQW 6 587 70.276 58.873 8 377 55.022 40.104 59.184 110.612 
RIC 0 91 13.880 13.097 0 107 22.334 17.860 16.958 36.515 
RG 2 503 98.878 79.404 1 723 89.596 77.020 93.315 148.136 
SJR 27 604 141.158 83.708 7 587 136.666 90.718 133.972 172.836 
TOC 7 241 69.016 34.713 7 202 62.338 30.929 61.027 59.904 
Widely-held Firms 
 Buys Sells 
 Min Max Avg Std Min Max Avg Std 
epsilon mu 
AZK 0 310 22.732 34.503 0 188 18.638 19.429 20.423 109.712 
BMO 13 295 70.314 33.883 6 262 61.546 30.984 62.689 66.097 
BNS 6 218 55.824 33.136 0 191 37.820 26.901 44.057 65.710 
BGO 183 11358 1590.446 1495.724 217 10707 1544.712 1439.375 993.543 858.593 
BEL 0 651 66.470 74.722 0 881 57.610 69.191 58.698 114.179 
CGT 0 278 27.406 25.617 0 248 24.168 23.507 27.034 71.963 
HCH 0 219 2.990 10.332 0 46 3.628 4.280 1.973 7.596 
CCJ 60 3264 803.664 631.774 46 2678 645.104 537.915 558.949 696.187 
CNQ 90 3294 846.500 650.613 73 2809 663.858 544.044 548.238 741.470 
CM 0 55 5.190 5.971 0 20 2.950 3.551 3.575 10.280 
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CNI 182 2013 674.720 286.430 169 1543 548.930 224.282 553.724 415.322 
CP 65 1905 334.476 238.610 55 1614 279.850 187.896 273.397 331.587 
KRY 28 2555 252.826 259.441 24 2232 234.620 229.332 208.016 378.375 
EGO 15 2168 212.962 223.875 29 1549 178.734 182.002 154.258 235.259 
ENB 3 1023 112.664 117.697 0 492 86.046 82.847 98.128 204.477 
ERF 250 2112 571.910 264.767 111 3646 415.526 319.450 426.201 445.684 
EENC 73 4277 430.256 422.563 27 4863 438.484 482.385 327.949 422.695 
FHR 86 1623 384.366 198.866 65 1004 293.468 129.890 302.752 307.330 
GRS 20 542 110.358 80.161 14 802 105.470 81.858 98.194 151.825 
GSS 129 4960 822.816 578.377 139 4572 806.906 552.899 664.626 611.477 
GBN 5 549 63.538 53.810 8 366 70.848 52.294 63.014 107.488 
IAG 21 1536 158.000 111.384 27 673 137.850 86.528 134.320 160.393 
IMO 35 682 159.432 93.859 8 590 114.268 76.075 124.958 163.496 
N 0 4283 1368.550 550.019 356 4262 1158.838 482.618 1127.175 785.249 
IDR 31 650 168.864 91.349 12 540 136.484 74.236 139.799 141.705 
IPS 1 2156 349.258 324.605 2 1412 314.528 304.931 314.148 391.346 
KFS 0 207 32.616 26.483 0 219 34.912 28.336 33.663 60.497 
MFC 130 2207 440.212 177.249 172 2314 443.204 180.445 411.385 284.763 
MRB 0 370 33.580 33.319 0 231 33.490 29.696 32.426 73.597 
NCX 72 2196 489.000 335.484 56 1840 382.598 261.123 391.795 458.380 
NXG 35 1505 256.828 212.439 40 1511 233.004 170.568 225.934 380.617 
PMU 0 766 93.690 96.824 8 586 98.146 85.244 91.959 208.643 
PTF 125 1636 461.406 220.862 53 2061 309.516 243.168 318.912 329.377 
PDG 542 11927 1420.600 741.182 388 11056 1212.512 676.819 1163.842 745.332 
PVX 163 3503 555.212 283.353 85 2618 331.728 257.915 343.158 375.439 
RY 13 498 104.606 46.290 23 510 112.430 46.873 102.929 86.366 
SLF 40 578 201.922 80.831 37 502 207.656 69.815 191.558 144.383 
SU 406 5703 1613.022 1063.908 205 5375 1179.230 873.841 876.422 875.335 
TU 1 1367 96.564 103.577 1 354 70.482 57.698 75.588 136.367 
TLM 128 3947 783.420 515.298 105 2310 615.196 395.570 601.515 683.503 
TAC 0 199 22.366 18.399 0 151 22.444 19.576 22.868 47.007 
TRP 56 883 229.512 123.857 50 848 192.728 104.302 192.510 240.219 
TGA 10 2580 229.228 208.817 9 2465 208.708 189.618 198.097 282.557 
ZL 0 599 70.524 66.061 5 432 64.622 55.558 64.603 123.516 
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Appendix 2 
One Period per Day Analysis of NYSE/AMEX Listed Firms 
 
Table A2.1: PIN of Individual Family-Controlled Firms 
 
Symbol PIN (Easley et al 1996b) Modified PIN 
ABY 0.143 0.107 
AGT 0.146 0.092 
BVF 0.101 0.079 
BPO 0.170 0.137 
CFK 0.207 0.109 
GIB 0.130 0.082 
FLI 0.170 0.105 
CBJ 0.133 0.099 
CWG 0.051 0.014 
CLS 0.106 0.091 
CEF 0.162 0.113 
CJR 0.294 0.159 
DTC 0.144 0.104 
FFH 0.151 0.092 
FS 0.135 0.099 
GG 0.103 0.083 
HBG 0.178 0.124 
LGF 0.150 0.114 
MIM 0.126 0.089 
MGA 0.120 0.096 
MNG 0.148 0.098 
PAL 0.169 0.120 
OPY 0.382 0.125 
PPK 0.456 0.188 
IQW 0.127 0.075 
RIC 0.201 0.121 
RG 0.151 0.099 
SJR 0.115 0.079 
TOC 0.131 0.101 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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Table A2.2: PIN of Individual Widely-Held Firms 
 
Symbol 
PIN (Easley et al 
1996b) Modified PIN 
AZK 0.205 0.070 
BMO 0.110 0.081 
BNS 0.154 0.104 
BGO 0.130 0.105 
BEL 0.194 0.122 
CGT 0.136 0.067 
HCH 0.353 0.187 
CCJ 0.203 0.157 
CNQ 0.170 0.122 
CM 0.459 0.264 
CNI 0.131 0.109 
CP 0.134 0.096 
KRY 0.128 0.077 
EGO 0.144 0.096 
ENB 0.189 0.114 
ERF 0.143 0.110 
EENC 0.152 0.109 
FHR 0.132 0.101 
GRS 0.152 0.101 
GSS 0.133 0.105 
GBN 0.169 0.110 
IAG 0.144 0.105 
IMO 0.150 0.106 
N 0.095 0.078 
IDR 0.149 0.116 
IPS 0.176 0.132 
KFS 0.149 0.092 
MFC 0.085 0.069 
MRB 0.163 0.091 
NCX 0.169 0.129 
NXG 0.139 0.088 
PMU 0.164 0.092 
PTF 0.181 0.145 
PDG 0.091 0.075 
PVX 0.221 0.183 
RY 0.087 0.067 
SLF 0.098 0.079 
SU 0.162 0.129 
TU 0.231 0.158 
TLM 0.164 0.125 
TAC 0.137 0.078 
TRP 0.148 0.107 
TGA 0.169 0.119 
ZL 0.166 0.102 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3.1: Test of Similar parameters across two periods 
 
  Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**) & 1%(***) 
Family-controlled firms Widely-held firms 
Symbol ε M = ε A µM = µA Symbol ε M = ε A µM = µA
ABY *** *** HCH *** *** 
AGT *** *** CCJ *** *** 
BVF *** *** CNQ *** *** 
BPO *** *** CM **  
CFK *** *** CNI *** *** 
GIB *** *** CP *** *** 
FLI **  KRY  *** 
CBJ *** *** EGO *** *** 
CWG  *** ENB ***  
CLS *** *** ERF *** *** 
CEF *** *** EENC *** *** 
CJR ***  FHR *** *** 
DTC *** *** GRS *** *** 
FFH *** *** GSS *** *** 
FS ***  GBN *** *** 
GG *** *** IAG *** *** 
HBG *** *** IMO ** *** 
LGF *** *** N ***  
MIM *** *** IDR *** *** 
MGA *** *** IPS *** *** 
MNG *** *** KFS  * 
PAL *** *** MFC *** *** 
OPY ** *** MRB *** *** 
PPK  *** NCX *** *** 
IQW ***  NXG *** *** 
RIC *** *** PMU *** *** 
RG *** *** PTF *** *** 
SJR *** *** PDG *** *** 
TOC *** *** PVX *** *** 
Widely-held firms RY *** *** 
Symbol ε M = ε A µM = µA SLF *** *** 
AZK  *** SU *** *** 
BMO *** *** TU *** *** 
BNS *** *** TLM *** *** 
BGO *** *** TAC *** *** 
BEL *** *** TRP   
CGT *** *** TGA *** *** 
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      ZL *** *** 
Note: We estimate the maximum likelihood by putting appropriate weights 
to the morning and afternoon sessions, i.e. 3.5 hours and 3 hours in this 
table.
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Appendix 4 
Table A4.1: Test of No Information Events (Two Periods) 
Family-controlled Firms  Widely-held Firms 
Symbol αM=0 αA=0 αM=αA=0  Symbol αM=0 αA=0 αM=αA=0 
ABY *** *** ***  CCJ *** *** *** 
AGT *** *** ***  CNQ *** *** *** 
BVF *** *** ***  CM *** *** *** 
BPO *** *** ***  CNI *** *** *** 
CFK *** *** ***  CP *** *** *** 
GIB *** *** ***  KRY *** *** *** 
FLI *** *** ***  EGO *** *** *** 
CBJ *** *** ***  ENB *** *** *** 
CWG *** *** ***  ERF *** *** *** 
CLS *** *** ***  EENC *** *** *** 
CEF *** *** ***  FHR *** *** *** 
CJR *** *** ***  GRS *** *** *** 
DTC *** *** ***  GSS *** *** *** 
FFH *** *** ***  GBN *** *** *** 
FS *** *** ***  IAG *** *** *** 
GG *** *** ***  IMO *** *** *** 
HBG *** *** ***  N *** *** *** 
LGF *** *** ***  IDR *** *** *** 
MIM *** *** ***  IPS *** *** *** 
MGA *** *** ***  KFS *** *** *** 
MNG *** *** ***  MFC *** *** *** 
PAL *** *** ***  MRB *** *** *** 
OPY *** *** ***  NCX *** *** *** 
PPK *** *** ***  NXG *** *** *** 
IQW *** *** ***  PMU *** *** *** 
RIC *** *** ***  PTF *** *** *** 
RG *** *** ***  PDG *** *** *** 
SJR *** *** ***  PVX *** *** *** 
TOC *** *** ***  RY *** *** *** 
Widely-held Firms  SLF *** *** *** 
AZK *** *** ***  SU *** *** *** 
BMO *** *** ***  TU *** *** *** 
BNS *** *** ***  TLM *** *** *** 
BGO *** *** ***  TAC *** *** *** 
BEL *** *** ***  TRP *** *** *** 
CGT *** *** ***  TGA *** *** *** 
HCH *** *** ***  ZL *** *** *** 
Note: We use the LR test statistic to test the null hypothesis of no 
information events. *** and ** refer to 1% and 5% significance level. 
 
 
99
Table A4.2: Test of No Information Events (One Period) 
 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**) & 1%(***) 
Family-controlled Firms  Widely-held Firms 
Symbol α =0  Symbol α=0 
ABY ***  CCJ *** 
AGT ***  CNQ *** 
BVF ***  CM *** 
BPO ***  CNI *** 
CFK ***  CP *** 
GIB ***  KRY *** 
FLI ***  EGO *** 
CBJ ***  ENB *** 
CWG ***  ERF *** 
CLS ***  EENC *** 
CEF ***  FHR *** 
CJR ***  GRS *** 
DTC ***  GSS *** 
FFH ***  GBN *** 
FS ***  IAG *** 
GG ***  IMO *** 
HBG ***  N *** 
LGF ***  IDR *** 
MIM ***  IPS *** 
MGA ***  KFS *** 
MNG ***  MFC *** 
PAL ***  MRB *** 
OPY ***  NCX *** 
PPK ***  NXG *** 
IQW ***  PMU *** 
RIC ***  PTF *** 
RG ***  PDG *** 
SJR ***  PVX *** 
TOC ***  RY *** 
Widely-held Firms  SLF *** 
AZK ***  SU *** 
BMO ***  TU *** 
BNS ***  TLM *** 
BGO ***  TAC *** 
BEL ***  TRP *** 
CGT ***  TGA *** 
HCH ***  ZL *** 
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Table A4.3: Test of No Information Events (Three Periods) 
 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**) & 1%(***) 
Family-controlled Firms  Widely-held Firms 
Symbol αF=0 αS=0 αT=0 αF=αS=αT=0  Symbol αF=0 αS=0 αT=0 αF=αS=αT=0 
ABY *** *** *** ***  CCJ *** *** *** *** 
AGT *** *** *** ***  CNQ *** *** *** *** 
BVF *** *** *** ***  CM *** *** *** *** 
BPO *** *** *** ***  CNI *** *** *** *** 
CFK *** *** *** ***  CP *** *** *** *** 
GIB *** *** *** ***  KRY *** *** *** *** 
FLI *** *** *** ***  EGO *** *** *** *** 
CBJ *** *** *** ***  ENB *** *** *** *** 
CWG *** *** *** ***  ERF *** *** *** *** 
CLS *** *** *** ***  EENC *** *** *** *** 
CEF *** *** *** ***  FHR *** *** *** *** 
CJR *** *** *** ***  GRS *** *** *** *** 
DTC *** *** *** ***  GSS *** *** *** *** 
FFH *** *** *** ***  GBN *** *** *** *** 
FS *** *** *** ***  IAG *** *** *** *** 
GG *** *** *** ***  IMO *** *** *** *** 
HBG *** *** *** ***  N *** *** *** *** 
LGF *** *** *** ***  IDR *** *** *** *** 
MIM *** *** *** ***  IPS *** *** *** *** 
MGA *** *** *** ***  KFS *** *** *** *** 
MNG *** *** *** ***  MFC *** *** *** *** 
PAL *** *** *** ***  MRB *** *** *** *** 
OPY *** *** *** ***  NCX *** *** *** *** 
PPK *** *** *** ***  NXG *** *** *** *** 
IQW *** *** *** ***  PMU *** *** *** *** 
RIC *** *** *** ***  PTF *** *** *** *** 
RG *** *** *** ***  PDG *** *** *** *** 
SJR *** *** *** ***  PVX *** *** *** *** 
TOC *** *** *** ***  RY *** *** *** *** 
Widely-held Firms  SLF *** *** *** *** 
AZK *** *** *** ***  SU *** *** *** *** 
BMO *** *** *** ***  TU *** *** *** *** 
BNS *** *** *** ***  TLM *** *** *** *** 
BGO *** *** *** ***  TAC *** *** *** *** 
BEL *** *** *** ***  TRP *** *** *** *** 
CGT *** *** *** ***  TGA *** *** *** *** 
HCH *** *** *** ***  ZL *** *** *** *** 
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Appendix 5 
Two Periods per Day Analysis of NYSE/AMEX Listed Firms 
 
Table A5.1: PIN of Individual Family-Controlled Firms 
 
Firm Symbol PINM (Easley et al (1996b)) 
PINA (Easley et 
al (1996b)) Modified PINM Modified PINA
ABY 0.145 0.160 0.100 0.120 
AGT 0.160 0.166 0.094 0.093 
BVF 0.112 0.112 0.082 0.081 
BPO 0.176 0.171 0.141 0.133 
CFK 0.203 0.233 0.099 0.124 
GIB 0.145 0.148 0.083 0.079 
FLI 0.172 0.186 0.101 0.099 
CBJ 0.132 0.142 0.097 0.095 
CWG 0.049 0.042 0.043 0.036 
CLS 0.105 0.117 0.087 0.098 
CEF 0.154 0.179 0.098 0.125 
CJR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DTC 0.136 0.149 0.085 0.102 
FFH 0.155 0.168 0.091 0.098 
FS 0.146 0.126 0.101 0.091 
GG 0.108 0.117 0.080 0.083 
HBG 0.177 0.202 0.113 0.134 
LGF 0.151 0.161 0.107 0.118 
MIM 0.119 0.146 0.071 0.099 
MGA 0.122 0.114 0.093 0.085 
MNG 0.148 0.160 0.090 0.097 
PAL 0.169 0.173 0.110 0.119 
OPY 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.018 
PPK 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.010 
IQW 0.114 0.130 0.047 0.069 
RIC 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 
RG 0.160 0.165 0.104 0.103 
SJR 0.127 0.127 0.084 0.083 
TOC 0.129 0.141 0.095 0.099 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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Table A5.2: PIN of Individual Widely-Held Firms 
 
Firm Symbol PINM (Easley et al (1996b)) 
PINA (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
Modified 
PINM
Modified PINA
AZK 0.227 0.241 0.085 0.075 
BMO 0.119 0.123 0.084 0.085 
BNS 0.172 0.178 0.115 0.115 
BGO 0.144 0.157 0.112 0.120 
BEL 0.190 0.214 0.108 0.133 
CGT 0.150 0.185 0.074 0.086 
HCH 0.018 0.003 0.017 0.003 
CCJ 0.193 0.185 0.143 0.135 
CNQ 0.167 0.173 0.114 0.120 
CM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CNI 0.136 0.123 0.110 0.100 
CP 0.144 0.134 0.102 0.088 
KRY 0.147 0.139 0.082 0.084 
EGO 0.126 0.148 0.070 0.075 
ENB 0.185 0.197 0.105 0.119 
ERF 0.144 0.149 0.102 0.115 
EENC 0.160 0.150 0.099 0.098 
FHR 0.142 0.140 0.105 0.106 
GRS 0.154 0.171 0.093 0.103 
GSS 0.150 0.137 0.114 0.097 
GBN 0.188 0.179 0.115 0.106 
IAG 0.146 0.180 0.103 0.131 
IMO 0.142 0.138 0.096 0.089 
N 0.101 0.096 0.080 0.075 
IDR 0.153 0.143 0.113 0.107 
IPS 0.175 0.176 0.128 0.125 
KFS 0.155 0.196 0.089 0.121 
MFC 0.088 0.086 0.068 0.068 
MRB 0.180 0.195 0.100 0.098 
NCX 0.179 0.169 0.132 0.125 
NXG 0.162 0.156 0.098 0.091 
PMU 0.166 0.171 0.084 0.084 
PTF 0.175 0.206 0.130 0.167 
PDG 0.100 0.097 0.081 0.078 
PVX 0.198 0.244 0.155 0.202 
RY 0.109 0.091 0.082 0.068 
SLF 0.103 0.106 0.081 0.082 
SU 0.154 0.154 0.109 0.113 
TU 0.238 0.224 0.158 0.139 
TLM 0.158 0.169 0.118 0.125 
TAC 0.136 0.167 0.077 0.079 
TRP 0.143 0.152 0.097 0.110 
TGA 0.168 0.183 0.110 0.126 
ZL 0.171 0.172 0.091 0.099 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
 
 
 
103
Appendix 6 
Three Periods per Day Analysis of NYSE/AMEX Listed Firms 
 
Table A6.1: PIN of Individual Family-Controlled Firms 
 
Firm 
Symbol 
PINF (Easley 
et al (1996b)) 
PINS (Easley 
et al (1996b)) 
PINT (Easley 
et al (1996b)) 
Modified 
PINF
Modified 
PINS
Modified 
PINT
ABY 0.161 0.155 0.164 0.107 0.110 0.119 
AGT 0.168 0.180 0.189 0.087 0.110 0.099 
BVF 0.118 0.106 0.114 0.080 0.075 0.079 
BPO 0.171 0.180 0.180 0.131 0.139 0.141 
CFK 0.211 0.226 0.242 0.100 0.112 0.121 
GIB 0.128 0.168 0.165 0.064 0.082 0.092 
FLI 0.073 0.256 0.098 0.040 0.183 0.052 
CBJ 0.152 0.144 0.148 0.103 0.100 0.108 
CWG 0.382 0.377 0.447 0.143 0.137 0.135 
CLS 0.103 0.123 0.110 0.081 0.102 0.090 
CEF 0.158 0.175 0.185 0.095 0.119 0.123 
CJR 0.338 0.293 0.359 0.102 0.113 0.147 
DTC 0.144 0.146 0.162 0.088 0.093 0.109 
FFH 0.154 0.147 0.166 0.081 0.083 0.090 
FS 0.142 0.146 0.133 0.091 0.101 0.097 
GG 0.118 0.116 0.122 0.083 0.082 0.085 
HBG 0.197 0.204 0.198 0.114 0.134 0.128 
LGF 0.139 0.152 0.165 0.086 0.109 0.116 
MIM 0.118 0.137 0.142 0.066 0.080 0.099 
MGA 0.130 0.122 0.121 0.095 0.092 0.091 
MNG 0.164 0.175 0.156 0.095 0.109 0.087 
PAL 0.191 0.171 0.184 0.117 0.114 0.125 
OPY 0.419 0.378 0.430 0.205 0.160 0.168 
PPK 0.526 0.478 0.527 0.118 0.140 0.156 
IQW 0.177 0.117 0.112 0.080 0.062 0.052 
RIC 0.389 0.290 0.320 0.208 0.176 0.187 
RG 0.177 0.151 0.183 0.115 0.092 0.111 
SJR 0.146 0.122 0.126 0.098 0.076 0.079 
TOC 0.129 0.149 0.150 0.089 0.106 0.104 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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Table A6.2: PIN of Individual Widely-Held Firms 
Firm 
Symbol 
PINF (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
PINS (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
PINT (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
Modified 
PINF
Modified 
PINS
Modified 
PINT
AZK 0.131 0.207 0.206 0.048 0.055 0.055 
BMO 0.139 0.123 0.135 0.092 0.085 0.092 
BNS 0.173 0.179 0.197 0.109 0.115 0.128 
BGO 0.156 0.131 0.154 0.114 0.094 0.103 
BEL 0.168 0.194 0.240 0.079 0.112 0.144 
CGT 0.146 0.189 0.017 0.075 0.085 0.006 
HCH 0.453 0.416 0.409 0.185 0.154 0.153 
CCJ 0.189 0.205 0.181 0.137 0.152 0.128 
CNQ 0.171 0.174 0.171 0.120 0.118 0.118 
CM 0.636 0.519 0.534 0.306 0.203 0.205 
CNI 0.139 0.137 0.118 0.109 0.111 0.094 
CP 0.154 0.139 0.143 0.108 0.090 0.090 
KRY 0.165 0.130 0.139 0.093 0.064 0.076 
EGO 0.132 0.138 0.149 0.061 0.070 0.070 
ENB 0.196 0.199 0.192 0.114 0.112 0.114 
ERF 0.151 0.149 0.148 0.097 0.111 0.114 
EENC 0.197 0.161 0.148 0.119 0.102 0.087 
FHR 0.136 0.148 0.137 0.095 0.111 0.101 
GRS 0.139 0.162 0.168 0.067 0.100 0.102 
GSS 0.147 0.144 0.140 0.099 0.105 0.095 
GBN 0.203 0.180 0.212 0.116 0.106 0.129 
IAG 0.150 0.167 0.204 0.097 0.120 0.141 
IMO 0.155 0.152 0.134 0.104 0.100 0.081 
N 0.106 0.108 0.105 0.081 0.086 0.082 
IDR 0.181 0.160 0.151 0.127 0.122 0.111 
IPS 0.181 0.170 0.185 0.127 0.118 0.132 
KFS 0.162 0.179 0.190 0.075 0.106 0.105 
MFC 0.089 0.099 0.081 0.066 0.078 0.061 
MRB 0.177 0.185 0.206 0.083 0.091 0.099 
NCX 0.167 0.172 0.162 0.116 0.123 0.118 
NXG 0.168 0.165 0.158 0.093 0.103 0.096 
PMU 0.199 0.173 0.170 0.104 0.086 0.071 
PTF 0.167 0.188 0.209 0.110 0.147 0.167 
PDG 0.103 0.097 0.095 0.082 0.076 0.075 
PVX 0.201 0.227 0.245 0.147 0.187 0.199 
RY 0.116 0.105 0.116 0.081 0.077 0.088 
SLF 0.105 0.117 0.121 0.080 0.093 0.091 
SU 0.153 0.158 0.153 0.103 0.114 0.108 
TU 0.235 0.228 0.221 0.148 0.151 0.131 
TLM 0.164 0.165 0.165 0.122 0.122 0.118 
TAC 0.207 0.090 0.285 0.113 0.060 0.109 
TRP 0.145 0.155 0.144 0.099 0.106 0.102 
TGA 0.175 0.179 0.198 0.105 0.119 0.136 
ZL 0.192 0.181 0.167 0.095 0.105 0.089 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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Appendix 7 
Event Study of NYSE/AMEX Listed Firms 
 
Table A7.1: Parameter Estimates around the Event Window 
 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Symbol αM αF αM αF εM εA εM εA μM μA μM μA
AEM 0.335 0.531 0.385 0.386 209.235 178.368 334.392 230.357 143.546 98.709 228.759 152.080 
SNG 0.150 0.166 0.259 0.117 49.432 39.817 83.373 79.455 113.404 82.989 169.676 264.454 
COT 0.211 0.050 0.167 0.267 71.518 90.637 167.042 134.554 85.734 192.734 224.920 131.023 
GIL 0.118 0.216 0.217 0.372 82.014 76.408 124.652 96.244 164.922 104.548 198.368 108.304 
GLG 0.456 0.469 0.217 0.234 324.241 233.150 316.266 242.656 219.870 150.088 238.091 221.223 
MDG 0.475 0.418 0.218 0.350 273.194 233.927 208.015 176.011 143.137 119.535 192.325 125.707 
MFN 0.361 0.239 0.233 0.329 23.098 23.566 19.259 15.530 32.339 37.347 26.828 22.087 
POT 0.168 0.387 0.407 0.283 300.054 233.518 301.117 280.491 276.367 205.477 293.498 345.405 
VGZ 0.378 0.309 0.322 0.344 30.396 22.735 23.170 17.164 46.109 32.317 45.055 31.215 
Average 0.295 0.310 0.269 0.298 151.465 125.792 175.254 141.385 136.159 113.749 179.724 155.722 
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Appendix 8 
Analysis of NASDAQ Listed Firms 
 
Table A8.1: Two Periods per Day Analysis 
 
Firm Symbol PINM (Easley et al (1996b)) 
PINA (Easley et al 
(1996b)) Modified PINM Modified PINA
Family-Controlled Firms 
BLD 0.119 0.104 0.088 0.077 
CSL 0.247 0.222 0.098 0.079 
EXF 0.176 0.228 0.072 0.107 
FSR 0.204 0.231 0.107 0.125 
HYG 0.143 0.116 0.091 0.072 
IMA 0.142 0.151 0.101 0.118 
IVA 0.142 0.144 0.103 0.103 
JCT 0.330 0.305 0.087 0.071 
MER 0.184 0.175 0.107 0.106 
NRM 0.157 0.157 0.103 0.105 
RIM 0.068 0.085 0.061 0.076 
STK 0.152 0.139 0.105 0.101 
TES 0.148 0.173 0.078 0.099 
ZIC 0.189 0.168 0.100 0.087 
Widely-Held Firms 
BIO 0.143 0.150 0.086 0.095 
CSP 0.151 0.157 0.072 0.079 
DRA 0.164 0.170 0.092 0.101 
FMT 0.187 0.160 0.097 0.082 
HUM 0.186 0.176 0.079 0.110 
MEO 0.122 0.128 0.087 0.099 
PAA 0.107 0.112 0.084 0.083 
SSP 0.183 0.163 0.094 0.080 
TLC 0.141 0.144 0.099 0.108 
VSG 0.148 0.149 0.094 0.094 
WED 0.184 0.212 0.086 0.103 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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Table A8.2: Three Periods per Day Analysis 
 
Firm 
Symbol 
PINF (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
PINS (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
PINT (Easley et 
al (1996b)) 
Modified 
PINF
Modified 
PINS
Modified 
PINT
Family-Controlled Firms 
BLD 0.127 0.134 0.112 0.088 0.102 0.080 
CSL 0.573 0.540 0.559 0.162 0.191 0.172 
EXF 0.180 0.204 0.233 0.066 0.091 0.109 
FSR 0.341 0.384 0.368 0.146 0.215 0.190 
HYG 0.160 0.135 0.139 0.089 0.087 0.088 
IMA 0.155 0.153 0.135 0.100 0.113 0.090 
IVA 0.173 0.138 0.156 0.122 0.099 0.104 
JCT 0.420 0.468 0.411 0.064 0.103 0.058 
MER 0.198 0.171 0.204 0.119 0.094 0.124 
NRM 0.164 0.142 0.160 0.097 0.087 0.093 
RIM 0.077 0.081 0.100 0.067 0.071 0.086 
STK 0.165 0.152 0.141 0.101 0.111 0.097 
TES 0.168 0.155 0.169 0.082 0.087 0.091 
ZIC 0.186 0.203 0.196 0.088 0.110 0.096 
Widely-Held Firms 
BIO 0.167 0.151 0.156 0.092 0.091 0.089 
CSP 0.180 0.134 0.201 0.080 0.062 0.106 
DRA 0.165 0.183 0.176 0.072 0.116 0.103 
FMT 0.194 0.179 0.171 0.091 0.095 0.081 
HUM 0.421 0.371 0.378 0.140 0.180 0.193 
MEO 0.134 0.129 0.126 0.090 0.095 0.089 
PAA 0.118 0.114 0.121 0.091 0.088 0.089 
SSP 0.185 0.183 0.155 0.085 0.088 0.070 
TLC 0.148 0.142 0.138 0.097 0.097 0.092 
VSG 0.161 0.162 0.153 0.097 0.106 0.093 
WED 0.202 0.160 0.208 0.083 0.064 0.084 
According to Easley et al (1996b), PIN = αµ/(2ε + αµ) and Modified PIN = αµ/(2ε + µ) 
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